Commit graph

2270 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard fd1f9e735e Fix whitespace at EOL issues 2015-11-02 05:55:58 +09:00
Janos Follath 860f239eb9 Fixed pathlen contraint enforcement. 2015-11-02 05:55:28 +09:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 9f44a80ea3 Try to prevent some misuse of RSA functions
fixes #331
2015-10-30 10:57:43 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 93080dfacf Fix missing check for RSA key length on EE certs
- also adapt tests to use lesser requirement for compatibility with old
  testing material
2015-10-28 13:22:32 +01:00
Simon Butcher 94c5e3c654 Fixed typo in comment 2015-10-28 13:21:12 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard a314076486 Fix handling of non-fatal alerts
fixes #308
2015-10-28 13:19:55 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 5baec9050e Fix warning in some reduced configs 2015-10-28 13:16:56 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard f9945bc283 Fix #ifdef inconsistency
fixes #310

Actually all key exchanges that use a certificate use signatures too, and
there is no key exchange that uses signatures but no cert, so merge those two
flags.

Conflicts:
	ChangeLog
2015-10-28 13:16:33 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 00992d45c0 Optimize more common cases in ecp_muladd() 2015-10-27 10:30:36 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 241bf6717a Optimize some case of mbedtls_ecp_muladd()
Those are used by EC-JPAKE
2015-10-27 10:30:03 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 770f453547 Remove useless code
closes #321
2015-10-27 10:29:26 +01:00
Simon Butcher 60d41b5d87 Corrected URL/reference to MPI library 2015-10-27 10:28:11 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard c4e7d8a381 Bump version to 2.1.2
Yotta version bumped to 2.1.3, as we had to do one more patch release to the
yotta registry to accommodate for dependencies updates.
2015-10-05 19:13:36 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard a97ab2c8a6 Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted
* development:
  Remove inline workaround when not useful
  Fix macroization of inline in C++
2015-10-05 15:48:09 +01:00
Simon Butcher 7776fc36d3 Fix for #279 macroisation of 'inline' keyword 2015-10-05 15:44:18 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2d7083435d Fix references to non-standard SIZE_T_MAX
Turns out C99 doesn't define SIZE_T_MAX, so let's not use it.
2015-10-05 15:23:11 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 899ac849d0 Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted
* development:
  Upgrade yotta dependency versions
  Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc
  Add missing warning in doc
2015-10-05 14:47:43 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 0431735299 Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc
fixes #278
2015-10-05 12:17:49 +01:00
Simon Butcher 475cf0a98a Merge fix of IOTSSL-496 - Potential heap overflow
Fix for potential overflow in ssl_write_certificate_request()
2015-10-05 11:57:54 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 0223ab9d38 Fix macroization of inline in C++
When compiling as C++, MSVC complains about our macroization of a keyword.
Stop doing that as we know inline is always available in C++
2015-10-05 11:41:36 +01:00
Simon Butcher fec73a8eec Merge of fix for IOTSSL-481 - Double free
Potential double free in mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()
2015-10-05 10:40:31 +01:00
Simon Butcher 6418ffaadb Merge fix for IOTSSL-480 - base64 overflow issue 2015-10-05 09:54:11 +01:00
Simon Butcher a45aa1399b Merge of IOTSSL-476 - Random malloc in pem_read() 2015-10-05 00:26:36 +01:00
Simon Butcher e7f96f22ee Merge fix IOTSSL-475 Potential buffer overflow
Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.

Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).

Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
2015-10-04 23:43:05 +01:00
Simon Butcher d5ba4672b2 Merge fix for IOTSSL-474 PKCS12 Overflow
Fix stack buffer overflow in PKCS12
2015-10-04 22:47:59 +01:00
Simon Butcher 5b8d1d65f7 Fix for IOTSSL-473 Double free error
Fix potential double-free in mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(.)
2015-10-04 22:06:51 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard ef388f168d Merge branch 'development' into development-restricted
* development:
  Updated ChangeLog with credit
  Fix a fairly common typo in comments
  Make config check include for configs examples more consistent
2015-10-02 12:44:39 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard bc1babb387 Fix potential overflow in CertificateRequest 2015-10-02 11:20:28 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 0aa45c209a Fix potential overflow in base64_encode 2015-09-30 16:37:49 +02:00
Simon Butcher 5624ec824e Reordered TLS extension fields in client
Session ticket placed at end
2015-09-29 01:06:06 +01:00
Simon Butcher 04799a4274 Fixed copy and paste error
Accidental additional assignment in ssl_write_alpn_ext()
2015-09-29 00:31:09 +01:00
Simon Butcher 0fc94e9f83 Revised bounds checking on TLS extensions
Revisions following review feedback
2015-09-28 20:52:04 +01:00
Simon Butcher 9f81231fb8 Revised hostname length check from review 2015-09-28 19:22:33 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard d02a1daca7 Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 2015-09-28 19:47:50 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 24417f06fe Fix potential double-free in mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() 2015-09-28 18:09:45 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 58fb49531d Fix potential buffer overflow in mpi_read_string()
Found by Guido Vranken.

Two possible integer overflows (during << 2 or addition in BITS_TO_LIMB())
could result in far too few memory to be allocated, then overflowing the
buffer in the subsequent for loop.

Both integer overflows happen when slen is close to or greater than
SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 (ie 2^30 on a 32 bit system).

Note: one could also avoid those overflows by changing BITS_TO_LIMB(s << 2) to
CHARS_TO_LIMB(s >> 1) but the solution implemented looks more robust with
respect to future code changes.
2015-09-28 15:59:54 +02:00
Simon Butcher ed9976634f Added bounds checking for TLS extensions
IOTSSL-478 - Added checks to prevent buffer overflows.
2015-09-28 02:14:30 +01:00
Simon Butcher 89f77623b8 Added max length checking of hostname 2015-09-27 22:50:49 +01:00
Tillmann Karras 588ad50c5a Fix a fairly common typo in comments 2015-09-25 04:27:22 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 8cea8ad8b8 Bump version to 2.1.1 2015-09-17 11:58:45 +02:00
Simon Butcher ac58c53ab1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/development' 2015-09-16 23:25:25 +01:00
Simon Butcher 7dd82f8fd5 Merge branch 'development' with bugfix branch
Conflicts:
	ChangeLog
2015-09-16 16:21:38 +01:00
Simon Butcher 5793e7ef01 Merge 'development' into iotssl-411-port-reuse
Conflicts:
	ChangeLog
2015-09-16 15:25:53 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard f7022d1131 Fix bug in server parsing point formats extension
There is only one length byte but for some reason we skipped two, resulting in
reading one byte past the end of the extension. Fortunately, even if that
extension is at the very end of the ClientHello, it can't be at the end of the
buffer since the ClientHello length is at most SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN and the
buffer has some more room after that for MAC and so on. So there is no
buffer overread.

Possible consequences are:
- nothing, if the next byte is 0x00, which is a comment first byte for other
  extensions, which is why the bug remained unnoticed
- using a point format that was not offered by the peer if next byte is 0x01.
  In that case the peer will reject our ServerKeyExchange message and the
handshake will fail.
- thinking that we don't have a common point format even if we do, which will
  cause us to immediately abort the handshake.
None of these are a security issue.

The same bug was fixed client-side in fd35af15
2015-09-16 11:32:18 +02:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard ea5370d4a2 Don't allow reconnect during handshake
Especially for resumed handshake, it's entirely possible for an epoch=0
ClientHello to be retransmitted or arrive so late that the server is already
at epoch=1. There is no good way to detect whether it's that or a reconnect.

However:
- a late ClientHello seems more likely that client going down and then up
  again in the middle of a handshake
- even if that's the case, we'll time out on that handshake soon enough
- we don't want to break handshake flows that used to work
So the safest option is to not treat that as a reconnect.
2015-09-15 15:17:54 +02:00
Simon Butcher 49641ad799 Merge pull request #275 from embedthis/fix-1
FIX: compiler warning with recvfrom on 64-bit
2015-09-14 19:59:28 +01:00
Simon Butcher d0bf6a3891 Update ssl_tls.c
Clarification in comments
2015-09-11 17:34:49 +01:00
Simon Butcher 74ca8d07ad Update ssl_tls.c
Clarification in comments to ssl_handle_possible_reconnect()
2015-09-11 17:22:40 +01:00
Simon Butcher 0789aed39d Update ssl_tls.c
Typo
2015-09-11 17:15:17 +01:00
Embedthis Software a25cab8bea FIX: compiler warning with recvfrom on 64-bit 2015-09-09 08:49:48 -07:00