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488 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jaeden Amero 3f8d78411a Update library version to 2.17.0 2019-03-19 16:12:55 +00:00
Simon Butcher 535ee4a35b Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2421' into development
* public/pr/2421: (68 commits)
  Fix unused variable warning in ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate()
  Add missing compile time guard in ssl_client2
  Update programs/ssl/query_config.c
  ssl_client2: Reset peer CRT info string on reconnect
  Add further debug statements on assertion failures
  Fix typo in documentation of ssl_parse_certificate_chain()
  Add debug output in case of assertion failure
  Fix typo in SSL ticket documentation
  Add config sanity check for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
  ssl_client2: Zeroize peer CRT info buffer when reconnecting
  Reintroduce numerous ssl-opt.sh tests if !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERT
  ssl_client2: Extract peer CRT info from verification callback
  Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()
  Improve documentation of MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
  Fix indentation of Doxygen comment in ssl_internal.h
  Set peer CRT length only after successful allocation
  Remove question in comment about verify flags on cli vs. server
  Remove misleading and redundant guard around restartable ECC field
  Add test for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE to all.sh
  Free peer CRT chain immediately after verifying it
  ...
2019-03-01 12:46:07 +00:00
Simon Butcher 195bddebcc Merge remote-tracking branch 'restricted/pr/528' into development
* restricted/pr/528:
  Update query_config.c
  Fix failure in SSLv3 per-version suites test
  Adjust DES exclude lists in test scripts
  Clarify 3DES changes in ChangeLog
  Fix documentation for 3DES removal
  Exclude 3DES tests in test scripts
  Fix wording of ChangeLog and 3DES_REMOVE docs
  Reduce priority of 3DES ciphersuites
2019-03-01 12:45:45 +00:00
Simon Butcher 74ac6e3fec Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2028' into development
* public/pr/2028:
  Update the crypto submodule to a78c958
  Fix ChangeLog entry to correct release version
  Fix typo in x509write test data
  Add ChangeLog entry for unused bits in bitstrings
  Improve docs for named bitstrings and their usage
  Add tests for (named) bitstring to suite_asn1write
  Add new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring()
2019-03-01 12:44:19 +00:00
Simon Butcher bbed914b41 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2447' into development
* public/pr/2447:
  Unbump version to 0.0.0
2019-03-01 12:41:25 +00:00
Simon Butcher 700cbac98a Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2448' into development
* public/pr/2448:
  Reword changelog entry
  Update change log
  Reenable GnuTLS next based tests
2019-03-01 12:40:43 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 56b9a939a0 Update query_config.c 2019-03-01 10:23:46 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard aa946b2d49 Fix failure in SSLv3 per-version suites test
The test used 3DES as the suite for SSLv3, which now makes the handshake fails
with "no ciphersuite in common", failing the test as well. Use Camellia
instead (as there are not enough AES ciphersuites before TLS 1.2 to
distinguish between the 3 versions).

Document some dependencies, but not all. Just trying to avoid introducing new
issues by using a new cipher here, not trying to make it perfect, which is a
much larger task out of scope of this commit.
2019-03-01 10:22:04 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 419bd0011f Adjust DES exclude lists in test scripts 2019-03-01 10:22:04 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia f8dffb3f34 Clarify 3DES changes in ChangeLog 2019-03-01 10:22:04 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia bdfba79f0d Fix documentation for 3DES removal 2019-03-01 10:21:11 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 2dadab7d3f Exclude 3DES tests in test scripts 2019-03-01 10:21:11 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 22a8905686 Fix wording of ChangeLog and 3DES_REMOVE docs 2019-03-01 10:21:11 +01:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 4a512281ec Reduce priority of 3DES ciphersuites 2019-03-01 10:19:27 +01:00
Hanno Becker 84d9d2734f Fix unused variable warning in ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate()
This was triggered in client-only builds.
2019-03-01 08:10:46 +00:00
Simon Butcher 1e198f5a98 Update the crypto submodule to a78c958
Update the crypto submodule to commit a78c958b17
to include the equivalent changes in this PR within the submodule.
2019-02-28 09:54:01 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia ce04951a6c Fix ChangeLog entry to correct release version 2019-02-28 09:40:12 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 412ddf3812 Fix typo in x509write test data 2019-02-28 09:38:03 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia d588ff7156 Add ChangeLog entry for unused bits in bitstrings 2019-02-28 09:38:03 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia d8233f76db Improve docs for named bitstrings and their usage 2019-02-28 09:36:30 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 7067f812f8 Add tests for (named) bitstring to suite_asn1write 2019-02-28 09:36:30 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 6e95914f0e Add new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring()
Add a new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring() that removes
trailing 0s at the end of DER encoded bitstrings. The function is
implemented according to Hanno Becker's suggestions.

This commit also changes the functions x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type
and crt_set_key_usage to call the new function as the use named
bitstrings instead of the regular bitstrings.
2019-02-28 09:36:30 +00:00
Hanno Becker bdf75eb243 Add missing compile time guard in ssl_client2 2019-02-27 08:34:31 +00:00
Hanno Becker 775655eead Update programs/ssl/query_config.c 2019-02-26 14:38:40 +00:00
Hanno Becker 23699efe78 ssl_client2: Reset peer CRT info string on reconnect 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker bd5580abb1 Add further debug statements on assertion failures 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 353a6f0d50 Fix typo in documentation of ssl_parse_certificate_chain() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 62d58ed975 Add debug output in case of assertion failure 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6883874013 Fix typo in SSL ticket documentation 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker fe4ef0c1ae Add config sanity check for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a1051b4e9a ssl_client2: Zeroize peer CRT info buffer when reconnecting 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker fe9aec4cb1 Reintroduce numerous ssl-opt.sh tests if !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERT 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a9766c2c23 ssl_client2: Extract peer CRT info from verification callback
So far, `ssl_client2` printed the CRT info for the peer's CRT
by requesting the latter through `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()`
at the end of the handshake, and printing it via
`mbedtls_x509_crt_info()`. When `MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE`
is disabled, this does no longer work because the peer's CRT
isn't stored beyond the handshake.

This makes some tests in `ssl-opt.sh` fail which rely on the CRT
info output for the peer certificate.

This commit modifies `ssl_client2` to extract the peer CRT info
from the verification callback, which is always called at a time
when the peer's CRT is available. This way, the peer's CRT info
is still printed if `MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE` is disabled.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 958efeb481 Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker fd7f298c6a Improve documentation of MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3fd3f5ebe4 Fix indentation of Doxygen comment in ssl_internal.h 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker accc5998ae Set peer CRT length only after successful allocation 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3acc9b9042 Remove question in comment about verify flags on cli vs. server 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1aed7779ec Remove misleading and redundant guard around restartable ECC field
`MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE` is only defined if
`MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED` is set, which
requires `MBEDTLS_X509_PARSE_C` to be set (this is checked
in `check_config.`). The additional `MBEDTLS_X509_PARSE_C`
guard around the `ecrs_peer_cert` field is therefore not
necessary; moreover, it's misleading, because it hasn't
been used consistently throughout the code.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 545ced45f7 Add test for !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE to all.sh 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6b8fbab290 Free peer CRT chain immediately after verifying it
If we don't need to store the peer's CRT chain permanently, we may
free it immediately after verifying it. Moreover, since we parse the
CRT chain in-place from the input buffer in this case, pointers from
the CRT structure remain valid after freeing the structure, and we
use that to extract the digest and pubkey from the CRT after freeing
the structure.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 0056eab3cd Parse peer's CRT chain in-place from the input buffer 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker ae553dde3a Free peer's public key as soon as it's no longer needed
On constrained devices, this saves a significant amount of RAM that
might be needed for subsequent expensive operations like ECDHE.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker b9d4479080 Correct compile-time guards for ssl_clear_peer_cert()
It is used in `mbedtls_ssl_session_free()` under
`MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C`, but defined only if
`MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED`.

Issue #2422 tracks the use of
`MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT_ENABLED` instead of
`MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C` for code and fields
related to CRT-based ciphersuites.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker e31505d64e Adapt ChangeLog 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker e68245750a Guard mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() by new compile-time option 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker d0aac14303 Add dependency to ssl-opt.sh tests which need peer CRT debug info 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker b6c5eca2d5 Adapt mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() to removal of peer_cert field 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 13c327d500 Adapt ssl_clear_peer_cert() to removal of peer_cert field 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6d1986e6f5 Adapt mbedtls_ssl_session_copy() to removal of peer_cert field 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 94cc26dfa6 Adapt session ticket implementation to removal of peer_cert field 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker abe6f66c00 Remove peer CRT from mbedtls_ssl_session if new option is disabled 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2a831a4ba7 Adapt client auth detection in ssl_parse_certificate_verify()
The server expects a CertificateVerify message only if it has
previously received a Certificate from the client.

So far, this was detected by looking at the `peer_cert` field
in the current session. Preparing to remove the latter, this
commit changes this to instead determine the presence of a peer
certificate by checking the new `peer_cert_digest` pointer.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 57b33c9e4e Use mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() to query peer cert in cert_app 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a1ab9be367 Adapt server-side signature verification to use raw public key
We must dispatch between the peer's public key stored as part of
the peer's CRT in the current session structure (situation until
now, and future behaviour if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is
enabled), and the sole public key stored in the handshake structure
(new, if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is disabled).
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a6899bb89d Adapt client-side signature verification to use raw public key
We must dispatch between the peer's public key stored as part of
the peer's CRT in the current session structure (situation until
now, and future behaviour if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is
enabled), and the sole public key stored in the handshake structure
(new, if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is disabled).
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker be7f50866d Adapt ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert() to use raw public key
We must dispatch between the peer's public key stored as part of
the peer's CRT in the current session structure (situation until
now, and future behaviour if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is
enabled), and the sole public key stored in the handshake structure
(new, if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is disabled).
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker c7d7e29b46 Adapt ssl_write_encrypted_pms() to use raw public key
We must dispatch between the peer's public key stored as part of
the peer's CRT in the current session structure (situation until
now, and future behaviour if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is
enabled), and the sole public key stored in the handshake structure
(new, if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is disabled).
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a27475335a Make a copy of peer's raw public key after verifying its CRT chain
This commit modifies `mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()` to store a
copy of the peer's public key after parsing and verifying the peer's
CRT chain.

So far, this leads to heavy memory duplication: We have the CRT chain
in the I/O buffer, then parse (and, thereby, copy) it to a
`mbedtls_x509_crt` structure, and then make another copy of the
peer's public key, plus the overhead from the MPI and ECP structures.

This inefficiency will soon go away to a significant extend, because:
- Another PR adds functionality to parse CRTs without taking
  ownership of the input buffers. Applying this here will allow
  parsing and verifying the peer's chain without making an additional
  raw copy. The overhead reduces to the size of `mbedtls_x509_crt`,
  the public key, and the DN structures referenced in the CRT.
- Once copyless parsing is in place and the removal of the peer CRT
  is fully implemented, we can extract the public key bounds from
  the parsed certificate and then free the entire chain before
  parsing the public key again. This means that we never store
  the parsed public key twice at the same time.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 75173121fe Add field for peer's raw public key to TLS handshake param structure
When removing the (session-local) copy of the peer's CRT chain, we must
keep a handshake-local copy of the peer's public key, as (naturally) every
key exchange will make use of that public key at some point to verify that
the peer actually owns the corresponding private key (e.g., verify signatures
from ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify, or encrypt a PMS in a RSA-based
exchange, or extract static (EC)DH parameters).

This commit adds a PK context field `peer_pubkey` to the handshake parameter
structure `mbedtls_handshake_params_init()` and adapts the init and free
functions accordingly. It does not yet make actual use of the new field.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 494dd7a6b4 Add raw public key buffer bounds to mbedtls_x509_crt struct
This commit adds an ASN.1 buffer field `pk_raw` to `mbedtls_x509_crt`
which stores the bounds of the raw public key data within an X.509 CRT.

This will be useful in subsequent commits to extract the peer's public
key from its certificate chain.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a887d1a5b6 Remove peer CRT from cache if !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker c966bd16be Remove peer CRT from tickets if !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker c5fcbb33c0 Add peer CRT digest to session tickets
This commit changes the format of session tickets to include
the digest of the peer's CRT if MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
is disabled.

This commit does not yet remove the peer CRT itself.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3dad311ef0 Parse and verify peer CRT chain in local variable
`mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()` parses the peer's certificate chain
directly into the `peer_cert` field of the `mbedtls_ssl_session`
structure being established. To allow to optionally remove this field
from the session structure, this commit changes this to parse the peer's
chain into a local variable instead first, which can then either be freed
after CRT verification - in case the chain should not be stored - or
mapped to the `peer_cert` if it should be kept. For now, only the latter
is implemented.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 177475a3aa Mitigate triple handshake attack by comparing digests only
This paves the way for the removal of the peer CRT chain from
`mbedtls_ssl_session`.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6bbd94c4eb Compute digest of peer's end-CRT in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 9198ad1101 Extend mbedtls_ssl_session by buffer holding peer CRT digest 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 8d84fd83ff Update version_features.c 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker bb278f52ca Add configuration option to remove peer CRT after handshake 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4a82c1ccb4 Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 8273df8383 Re-classify errors on missing peer CRT
mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() will fail if a ciphersuite requires
a certificate, but none is provided. While it is sensible to double-
check this, failure should be reported as an internal error and not
as an unexpected message.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 0329f75a93 Increase robustness and documentation of ticket implementation 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker aee8717877 Simplify session cache implementation via mbedtls_ssl_session_copy() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 52055ae91f Give ssl_session_copy() external linkage
A subsequent commit will need this function in the session ticket
and session cache implementations. As the latter are server-side,
this commit also removes the MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C guard.

For now, the function is declared in ssl_internal.h and hence not
part of the public API.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker c7bd780e02 Allow passing any X.509 CRT chain to ssl_parse_certificate_chain()
This commit modifies the helper `ssl_parse_certificate_chain()` to
accep any target X.509 CRT chain instead of hardcoding it to
`session_negotiate->peer_cert`. This increases modularity and paves
the way towards removing `mbedtls_ssl_session::peer_cert`.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6863619a2f Introduce helper function for peer CRT chain verification 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker fcd9e71cdf Don't progress TLS state machine on peer CRT chain parsing error 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 77adddc9e9 Make use of macro and helper detecting whether CertRequest allowed
This commit simplifies the client-side code for outgoing CertificateVerify
messages, and server-side code for outgoing CertificateRequest messages and
incoming CertificateVerify messages, through the use of the macro

   `MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED`

indicating whether a ciphersuite allowing CertificateRequest messages
is enabled in the configuration, as well as the helper function

   `mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed()`

indicating whether a particular ciphersuite allows CertificateRequest
messages.

These were already used in the client-side code to simplify the
parsing functions for CertificateRequest messages.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 28f2fcd08d Add helper function to check whether a CRT msg is expected
This commit adds a helper function `ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate()`
which checks whether a `Certificate` message is expected from the peer.

The logic is the following:
- For ciphersuites which don't use server-side CRTs, no Certificate
  message is expected (neither for the server, nor the client).
- On the server, no client certificate is expected in the following cases:
  * The server server didn't request a Certificate, which is controlled
    by the `authmode` setting.
  * A RSA-PSK suite is used; this is the only suite using server CRTs
    but not allowing client-side authentication.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 7177a88a36 Introduce helper function to determine whether suite uses server CRT
This commit introduces a static helper function

   `mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert()`

which determines whether a ciphersuite may make use of server-side CRTs.

This function is in turn uses in `mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()` to
skip certificate parsing for ciphersuites which don't involve CRTs.

Note: Ciphersuites not using server-side CRTs don't allow client-side CRTs
either, so it is safe to guard `mbedtls_ssl_{parse/write}_certificate()`
this way.

Note: Previously, the code uses a positive check over the suites

- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE,

while now, it uses a negative check over `mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert()`,
which checks for the suites

- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA
- MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA

This is equivalent since, together, those are all ciphersuites.
Quoting ssl_ciphersuites.h:

```
typedef enum {
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE = 0,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
    MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE,
} mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t;
```
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2148993900 Use helper macro to detect whether some ciphersuite uses CRTs 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6bdfab2ccc Unify state machine update in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()
The handler `mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()` for incoming `Certificate`
messages contains many branches updating the handshake state. For easier
reasoning about state evolution, this commit introduces a single code-path
updating the state machine at the end of `mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()`.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 7a955a043e Clear peer's CRT chain outside before parsing new one
If an attempt for session resumption fails, the `session_negotiate` structure
might be partially filled, and in particular already contain a peer certificate
structure. This certificate structure needs to be freed before parsing the
certificate sent in the `Certificate` message.

This commit moves the code-path taking care of this from the helper
function `ssl_parse_certificate_chain()`, whose purpose should be parsing
only, to the top-level handler `mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate()`.

The fact that we don't know the state of `ssl->session_negotiate` after
a failed attempt for session resumption is undesirable, and a separate
issue #2414 has been opened to improve on this.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4a55f638e2 Introduce helper to check for no-CRT notification from client
This commit introduces a server-side static helper function
`ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification()`, which checks if
the message we received during the incoming certificate state
notifies the server of the lack of certificate on the client.

For SSLv3, such a notification comes as a specific alert,
while for all other TLS versions, it comes as a `Certificate`
handshake message with an empty CRT list.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker a028c5bbd8 Introduce CRT counter to CRT chain parsing function
So far, we've used the `peer_cert` pointer to detect whether
we're parsing the first CRT, but that will soon be removed
if `MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE` is unset.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1294a0b260 Introduce helper function to clear peer CRT from session structure
This commit introduces a helper function `ssl_clear_peer_cert()`
which frees all data related to the peer's certificate from an
`mbedtls_ssl_session` structure. Currently, this is the peer's
certificate itself, while eventually, it'll be its digest only.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker f852b1c035 Break overly long line in definition of mbedtls_ssl_get_session() 2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Hanno Becker 60848e6574 Don't reuse CRT from initial handshake during renegotiation
After mitigating the 'triple handshake attack' by checking that
the peer's end-CRT didn't change during renegotation, the current
code avoids re-parsing the CRT by moving the CRT-pointer from the
old session to the new one. While efficient, this will no longer
work once only the hash of the peer's CRT is stored beyond the
handshake.

This commit removes the code-path moving the old CRT, and instead
frees the entire peer CRT chain from the initial handshake as soon
as the 'triple handshake attack' protection has completed.
2019-02-26 14:38:09 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 86016a03a1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2338' into development 2019-02-22 12:55:30 +00:00
Jaeden Amero e895342522 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2427' into development 2019-02-22 12:53:13 +00:00
Jaeden Amero d247762a8d Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2460' into development 2019-02-22 12:52:51 +00:00
Hanno Becker 85fd913950 Fix typo in check_config.h 2019-02-22 12:50:35 +00:00
Jaeden Amero caca307f42 crypto: Update submodule to Mbed Crypto 1.0.0d6 2019-02-22 10:48:48 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 415620c1f2 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2105' into development
Additional work done as part of merge:
    - Run ./tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh and check in the
      resulting changes to programs/ssl/query_config.c
2019-02-22 10:33:15 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 461bd3dcca Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2454' into development 2019-02-22 10:32:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 9f47f82218 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2391' into development 2019-02-22 10:32:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 8963b0311c Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2411' into development 2019-02-22 10:32:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero d9516b508a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2407' into development 2019-02-22 10:32:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 0ae63f7bc3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2383' into development 2019-02-22 10:32:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 241b524964 Disable restartable ECC in full config PSA test in all.sh 2019-02-22 10:26:30 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1ce51e4dc3 Forbid setting MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO_C
Restartable ECC isn't supported in PSA yet.
2019-02-22 10:25:47 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 3497323f79 Initialize PSA Crypto operation contexts
It is now required to initialize PSA Crypto operation contexts before
calling psa_*_setup(). Otherwise, one gets a PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE error.
2019-02-20 10:58:55 +00:00
k-stachowiak cddbd01e4f Reword changelog entry 2019-02-19 12:40:34 +01:00
k-stachowiak 6409724059 Update change log 2019-02-19 12:25:24 +01:00
Hanno Becker 135baef1bd Define maximum EC public key length depending on enabled curves 2019-02-18 17:04:24 +00:00
Hanno Becker 28f78440d8 Grep for debug output witnessing use of PSA in ECDHE ssl-opt.sh 2019-02-18 16:47:50 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4af484e29a Regenerate VS2010 project file 2019-02-18 16:42:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3b7c4a0ff0 Regenerate VisualStudio project file 2019-02-18 16:42:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker 354e248d81 Add ssl-opt.sh tests for PSA-based ECDH with various ECC curves 2019-02-18 16:42:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker 0a94a64bbd Add debugging output to confirm that PSA was used for ECDHE 2019-02-18 16:42:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker c14a3bb5a6 Make variable in ssl_write_client_key_exchange() more descriptive 2019-02-18 16:42:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4a63ed421c Implement ClientKeyExchange writing in PSA-based ECDHE suites
- Populate the ECDH private key slot with a fresh private EC key
  designated for the correct algorithm.
- Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA and
  reformat it to suite the format of the ClientKeyExchange message.
- Perform the PSA-based ECDH key agreement and store the result
  as the premaster secret for the connection.
2019-02-18 16:42:01 +00:00
Hanno Becker bb89e2727f Implement ServerKeyExchange parsing for PSA-based ECDHE suites
- Reformat the server's ECDH public key to make it suitable
  for the PSA key agreement API. Currently, the key agreement
  API needs a full SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, while the
  TLS ServerKeyExchange message only contains a ECPoint structure.
2019-02-18 16:42:01 +00:00
Hanno Becker df51dbe17f Add fields for PSA-based ECDHE to handshake structure
This is the first in a series of commits adding client-side
support for PSA-based ECDHE.

Previously, the state of an ECDHE key agreement was maintained
in the field mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::ecdh_ctx, of type
::mbedtls_ecdh_context and manipulated through the ECDH API.

The ECDH API will be superseeded by the PSA Crypto API for key
agreement, which needs the following data:
(a) A raw buffer holding the public part of the key agreement
    received from our peer.
(b) A key slot holding the private part of the key agreement.
(c) The algorithm to use.
The commit adds fields to ::mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
representing these three inputs to PSA-based key agreement.

Specifically, it adds a field for the key slot holding the
ECDH private key, a field for the EC curve identifier, and
a buffer holding the peer's public key.

Note: Storing the peer's public key buffer is slightly
inefficient, as one could perform the ECDH computation
as soon as the peer sends its public key, either working
with in-place or using a stack-buffer to reformat the
public key before passing it to PSA. This optimization
is left for a later commit.
2019-02-18 16:41:55 +00:00
Hanno Becker f75f912c31 Add functions to psa_util module to convert EC public keys 2019-02-18 16:37:12 +00:00
k-stachowiak 17a38d3a74 Reenable GnuTLS next based tests 2019-02-18 15:29:56 +01:00
k-stachowiak 28cb6fbd47 Unbump version to 0.0.0 2019-02-18 12:01:03 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 9c99dc862c
Merge pull request #2395 from ARMmbed/development-psa-merged-dev-8e76332
Merge updated development-psa into development
2019-02-18 11:55:54 +01:00
Andrzej Kurek 064128c1b0 Update submodule pointer to commit 0574e6a of mbed-crypto/development 2019-02-15 10:20:05 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 1b20be59e2 Write documentation for TEST_ASSERT 2019-02-15 10:13:35 -05:00
Jaeden Amero 2d7926674d psa_utils: Make fallthrough clear for compilers
Silence a compiler warning about implicit fallthrough by using a comment
format the compiler understand to mean that the fallthrough is
intentional.

  In file included from library/cipher.c:63:0:
  include/mbedtls/psa_util.h: In function ‘mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode’:
  include/mbedtls/psa_util.h:91:15: error: this statement may fall through [-Werror=implicit-fallthrough=]
               if( taglen == 0 )
                 ^
  include/mbedtls/psa_util.h:94:9: note: here
           default:
           ^~~~~~~
  cc1: all warnings being treated as errors

  $ gcc --version
  gcc (Ubuntu 7.3.0-27ubuntu1~18.04) 7.3.0
  Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
  warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
2019-02-15 09:50:38 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek eb5087126f all.sh: add a seedfile generation step
When using PSA with MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED, some test suites
require the seed file for PSA initialization, which was normally generated
later, when entropy tests were run. This change creates an initial seedfile
in all.sh.
2019-02-14 07:18:59 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c058773798 Update submodule pointer to dea02cc8b 2019-02-14 05:28:21 -05:00
Jaeden Amero 3ea2687053 psa: Initialize crypto in tests that need to
Don't unconditionally enable PSA Crypto for all tests. Only enable it in
tests that require it. This allows crypto tests to check that
psa_crypto_init() fails when it is supposed to fail, since we want to
perform some action in a test, and then call psa_crypto_init() and check
the result without it having been called previously.
2019-02-13 07:34:54 -05:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 54efcb7ff0 Update query config with VSNPRINTF macro 2019-02-11 21:55:09 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 08b807a161 Update crypto submodule version to commit f54597144874
Use mbed-crypto repository in gitmodules file
2019-02-11 08:45:41 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek f389629556 Move a restartable ecp context to a conditional compilation block
This was an unused variable when compiling with parameter validation
but without ecp_restartable
2019-02-11 05:15:54 -05:00
Jaeden Amero 6f7703df3a rsa: Enable use of zero-length null output
Enable handling of zero-length null output in PKCS1 v1.5 decryption.
Prevent undefined behavior by avoiding a memcpy() to zero-length null
output buffers.
2019-02-11 03:39:51 -05:00
Gilles Peskine 004f87b98d RSA encryption: accept input=NULL if ilen=0
In mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt and
mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt, if the input length is 0 (which
is unusual and mostly useless, but permitted) then it is fine for the
input pointer to be NULL. Don't return an error in this case.

When `input` is NULL, `memcpy( p, input, ilen )` has undefined behavior
even if `ilen` is zero. So skip the `memcpy` call in this case.
Likewise, in `mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt`, skip the `memcpy` call if
`*olen` is zero.
2019-02-11 03:39:21 -05:00
Hanno Becker 46f34d0ac0 Fix style issue and wording 2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker c1e18bdf06 Fix memory leak 2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker e2734e2be4 Improve formatting of ssl_parse_certificate_chain() 2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker 84879e32ef Add compile-time guards around helper routine 2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker bd9d51d969 Adapt ChangeLog 2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker def9bdc152 Don't store the peer CRT chain twice during renegotiation
Context: During a handshake, the SSL/TLS handshake logic constructs
an instance of ::mbedtls_ssl_session representing the SSL session
being established. This structure contains information such as the
session's master secret, the peer certificate, or the session ticket
issues by the server (if applicable).
During a renegotiation, the new session is constructed aside the existing
one and destroys and replaces the latter only when the renegotiation is
complete. While conceptually clear, this means that during the renegotiation,
large pieces of information such as the peer's CRT or the session ticket
exist twice in memory, even though the original versions are removed
eventually.

This commit removes the simultaneous presence of two peer CRT chains
in memory during renegotiation, in the following way:
- Unlike in the case of SessionTickets handled in the previous commit,
  we cannot simply free the peer's CRT chain from the previous handshake
  before parsing the new one, as we need to verify that the peer's end-CRT
  hasn't changed to mitigate the 'Triple Handshake Attack'.
- Instead, we perform a binary comparison of the original peer end-CRT
  with the one presented during renegotiation, and if it succeeds, we
  avoid re-parsing CRT by moving the corresponding CRT pointer from the
  old to the new session structure.
- The remaining CRTs in the peer's chain are not affected by the triple
  handshake attack protection, and for them we may employ the canonical
  approach of freeing them before parsing the remainder of the new chain.

Note that this commit intends to not change any observable behavior
of the stack. In particular:
- The peer's CRT chain is still verified during renegotiation.
- The tail of the peer's CRT chain may change during renegotiation.
2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker b2964cbe14 SSL/TLS client: Remove old session ticket on renegotiation
Context: During a handshake, the SSL/TLS handshake logic constructs
an instance of ::mbedtls_ssl_session representing the SSL session
being established. This structure contains information such as the
session's master secret, the peer certificate, or the session ticket
issues by the server (if applicable).

During a renegotiation, the new session is constructed aside the existing
one and destroys and replaces the latter only when the renegotiation is
complete. While conceptually clear, this means that during the renegotiation,
large pieces of information such as the peer's CRT or the session ticket
exist twice in memory, even though the original versions are removed
eventually.

This commit starts removing this memory inefficiency by freeing the old
session's SessionTicket before the one for the new session is allocated.
2019-02-08 14:26:41 +00:00
Hanno Becker ac4172c5bb Adapt ChangeLog 2019-02-08 14:24:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2d8a2c0852 Modify existing X.509 test for also test new copyless API
The existing test `x509parse_crt()` for X.509 CRT parsing
so far used the generic parsing API `mbedtls_x509_crt_parse()`
capable of parsing both PEM encoded and DER encoded certficates,
but was actually only used with DER encoded input data. Moreover,
as the purpose of the test is the testing of the core DER X.509 parsing
functionality, not the PEM vs. DER dispatch (which is now already tested
in the various `x509_crt_info()` tests), the call can be replaced with a
direct call to `mbedtls_x509_parse_crt_der()`.

This commit does that, and further adds to the test an analogous
call to the new API `mbedtls_x509_parse_crt_der_nocopy()` to test
copyless parsing of X.509 certificates.
2019-02-08 14:24:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 462c3e5210 Add test for mbedtls_x509_parse_file() with DER encoded CRT 2019-02-08 14:24:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1a65dcd44f Add a new X.509 API call for copy-less parsing of CRTs
Context:
The existing API `mbedtls_x509_parse_crt_der()` for parsing DER
encoded X.509 CRTs unconditionally makes creates a copy of the
input buffer in RAM. While this comes at the benefit of easy use,
-- specifically: allowing the user to free or re-use the input
buffer right after the call -- it creates a significant memory
overhead, as the CRT is duplicated in memory (at least temporarily).
This might not be tolerable a resource constrained device.

As a remedy, this commit adds a new X.509 API call

   `mbedtls_x509_parse_crt_der_nocopy()`

which has the same signature as `mbedtls_x509_parse_crt_der()`
and almost the same semantics, with one difference: The input
buffer must persist and be unmodified for the lifetime of the
established instance of `mbedtls_x509_crt`, that is, until
`mbedtls_x509_crt_free()` is called.
2019-02-08 14:24:58 +00:00
Jaeden Amero fb236739da Revert "Forbid passing NULL input buffers to RSA encryption routines"
Resolve incompatibilties in the RSA module where changes made for
parameter validation prevent Mbed Crypto from working. Mbed Crypto
depends on being able to pass zero-length buffers that are NULL to RSA
encryption functions.

This reverts commit 2f660d047d.
2019-02-08 08:43:31 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 02f39ace58 Adjust documentation of mbedtls_cipher_update_ad 2019-02-08 06:50:55 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 57f04e56c1 Adjust documentation of mbedtls_cipher_update_ad
Fix indentation and capitalization
2019-02-08 06:44:43 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 3c2b15d31e Update version_features file 2019-02-08 02:38:45 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 85ac0aeb58 Update submodule version to include parameter validation for rsa.c 2019-02-07 09:09:13 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 172457460b Add MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO to config.pl exclude list 2019-02-07 08:49:53 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek d3643ef29b Add PSA defines to config.pl exclude list 2019-02-07 07:41:27 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 70d8a5b5d9 Update crypto submodule version to 94a3abcd 2019-02-07 07:40:33 -05:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 17c53c5c1e Fix check-generated-files.sh failure with query_config 2019-02-07 10:38:23 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia e7856bfc6d Suppress visual studio preprocessor warnings on query_config.c 2019-02-07 10:38:23 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia bc432b8232 Use \r instead of 0xD in generate_visualc_files.pl 2019-02-07 10:38:23 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 8645f733cf Update query_config.c with new macros 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia ef672f0319 Exclude macros from query_config.c generation 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 27b3372c45 Fix query_config macro expansion for windows 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 5bc6e92b70 Fix query_config macro expansion for windows 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia c84a65da9d Fix missing include in vs proj files for query programs 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia cb9c015558 Improve cmake inclusion of query_config.c when building apps 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia c28da7ea43 Improve comments in query_config.fmt 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 5aca555391 Fix GCC 0-length printf format string error 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 2fdc2c299f Fix multiple stdio.h inclusion in query_config.c 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres AG 08457ce76b Fix aligment in programs/test/query_compile_time_config.c 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres AG 509ba69e16 Create programs/test/query_compile_time_config app 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres AG 458148681d Ensure query_config.c includes stdio only when needed 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 109f8b6100 Fix typo in quenerate_query_config.pl comment 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia bb923642c3 Update programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt with query_config.c dep 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia aabe52f036 Add ChangeLog entries 2019-02-07 10:38:22 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 4c981a09e8 Add gen_query_config.pl to check-gen-files and bump_version 2019-02-07 10:37:39 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 88121a96f6 Script generation of query_config.c file 2019-02-07 10:37:39 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 3b2f9d3ca8 query_config.c: remove duplicated inc of platform.h 2019-02-07 10:37:39 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 3169dc0619 ssl-opt: Use ssl_server2 to query config instead of grep and sed 2019-02-07 10:37:39 +00:00
Andres Amaya Garcia bc81884e3a Query config through ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 cmdline 2019-02-07 10:36:50 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 1767e40368 all.sh: fix submodule test names 2019-02-05 06:05:49 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 8a2e97c2df Merge development-psa commit 80b5662 into development-psa-merged branch
Adjust crypto submodule version to use new, forked crypto version accordingly.
2019-02-05 06:02:51 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek e9c3b8130a all.sh: move crypto submodule check to pre_check_git 2019-02-05 05:34:21 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c690523d2b Merge PSA config and check-config changes
Introduce MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM,
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C,
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C.
Disable crypto storage by default.
2019-02-05 05:26:00 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek d142856846 cipher: remove unnecessary precondition
Already checked by parameter validation macros
2019-02-05 05:11:03 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek efed323698 pk: restructure precondition check 2019-02-05 05:09:05 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek b274f2739e Documentation fixes 2019-02-05 05:06:35 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek fd0381a2c5 all.sh: change test_submodule to test_use_psa_crypto 2019-02-05 05:00:02 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 8764ccc83d ChangeLog: rearrange misplaced sections.
Add information about  mbed TLS 2.15.0 and  mbed TLS 2.15.1.
2019-02-05 04:57:13 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 246cc86f66 cipher: fix indentation 2019-02-05 04:40:53 -05:00
k-stachowiak a1dc9117a7 Correct code formatting in the timing test suites 2019-02-05 09:22:20 +01:00
k-stachowiak c5a4a13a5c Apply imperative style in the changelog entry 2019-02-05 09:11:58 +01:00
Jaeden Amero 80b566267f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2386' into development-psa 2019-02-04 16:42:23 +00:00
Jaeden Amero d18b264eaf Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2382' into development-psa 2019-02-04 16:41:46 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 65408c5f92 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2355' into development-psa 2019-02-04 16:41:12 +00:00
Jaeden Amero d4a31d3581 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2350' into development-psa 2019-02-04 16:40:06 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 1359a8f3c6 Update submodule version to point to fixed, forked repository 2019-02-04 07:32:12 -05:00
Peter Kolbus 995d5c1f8a Add ChangeLog entry 2019-02-03 09:01:55 -06:00
Peter Kolbus 1bc1a4c639 all.sh: Fix check_headers_in_cpp
When all.sh invokes check_headers_in_cpp, a backup config.h exists. This
causes a stray difference vs cpp_dummy_build.cpp. Fix by only collecting
the *.h files in include/mbedtls.

Change-Id: Ifd415027e856858579a6699538f06fc49c793570
2019-02-01 17:58:59 -06:00
Hanno Becker 70fc6550cc Update Crypto submodule to merge of sibling PR 2019-02-01 13:08:41 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek de5a007316 Merge development commit f352f7 into development-psa 2019-02-01 07:03:03 -05:00
Hanno Becker 65935d90c9 Add missing include to library/pkwrite.c 2019-02-01 11:55:03 +00:00
Hanno Becker 56104ea9bb Adapt test in test_suite_pk to work with new PSA public key format 2019-02-01 11:48:19 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 39456532c6 Update submodule version to 3a181009
Point to the new, merged version of the submodule branch
2019-02-01 05:47:17 -05:00
Hanno Becker 493c171a1c Adapt mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() to the new PSA public key format
Context: There are two public key writing functions in Mbed TLS. First,
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(), which exports a public key in the form of a
SubjectPublicKey structure containing the raw keying material
(for example, EC point coordinates for an EC public key, without
reference to the underlying curve). Secondly, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(),
which exports a public key in the form of a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure,
wrapping the SubjectPublicKey structure by additional information
identifying the type of public key (and for ECC, e.g., it'd also contain
the ECC group identifier). The implementation of mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der()
calls mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() first and then adds the corresponding
algorithm identifier wrapper.

Both of these functions need to be provided for PSA-based opaque PK contexts,
based on PSA's public key export function.

Previously, PSA used the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure as its export format,
so mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() could be easily implemented, while
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() would need to trim the output of the PSA export.

The previous implementation of mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() is not quite right
because it calls PSA export doesn't do any trimming, hence exporting the large
SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure instead of the small SubjectPublicKey.
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(), in turn, immediately returns after calling
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(), hence also returning the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure, which is correct.

By now, the PSA public key export format has changed to the smaller
SubjectPublicKey structure. This means that, now, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey()
can be implemented by just calling the PSA export, and that
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() needs to add the algorithm information around
it, just as in the other types of PK contexts. While not correct for the
old format, the existing code for mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() is therefore
correct for the new PSA public key format, and needs no change apart from
the missing pointer shift in the last commit.

The implementation of mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() needs a special code
path for PSA-based opaque PK contexts, as the PK context only contains
the PSA key handle, and the PSA API needs to be used to extract the
underlying EC curve to be able to write the AlgorithmParameter structure
that's part of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure.

That's what this commit does, (hopefully) making both
mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() and mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() export
the correctly formatted public key based on the new PSA public key format.
2019-02-01 10:25:25 +00:00
Hanno Becker 812e12452a Add function to find OID for PSA ECC curve identifiers 2019-02-01 10:06:51 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4fb8db23b9 Update pointer in PSA-based mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() 2019-02-01 09:57:20 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 409fdae6bf test_suite_ctr_drbg: use ctr_drbg_update_ret instead of ctr_drbg_update
Align files with development to ensure the same state of repositories.
2019-02-01 02:53:16 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek f093a3dc61 Use ecdh_setup instead of ecp_group_load
Align files with development to ensure the same state of repositories.
2019-02-01 02:50:36 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c470b6b021 Merge development commit 8e76332 into development-psa
Additional changes to temporarily enable running tests:
ssl_srv.c and test_suite_ecdh use mbedtls_ecp_group_load instead of
mbedtls_ecdh_setup
test_suite_ctr_drbg uses mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update instead of 
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret
2019-01-31 08:20:20 -05:00
Jaeden Amero f352f75f6b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2332' into development 2019-01-30 15:53:00 +00:00
Jaeden Amero c4cc2511d0 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2325' into development 2019-01-30 15:35:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 91af329a55 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2214' into development 2019-01-30 15:08:25 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 14eca249f1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2213' into development 2019-01-30 15:01:20 +00:00
Jaeden Amero c89148bba7 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2207' into development 2019-01-30 14:57:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero b18239713e Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2191' into development 2019-01-30 14:56:58 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 6f4a8ef1ee Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2137' into development 2019-01-30 14:55:09 +00:00
Jaeden Amero c42dd60f1f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/1949' into development 2019-01-30 14:46:35 +00:00
Jaeden Amero dac9f45e5a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/1551' into development 2019-01-30 13:24:55 +00:00
Jaeden Amero e6e2686cf8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2055' into development
Resolve conflicts in ctr_drbg.c where zeroization had been added upon
exit.
2019-01-30 13:23:03 +00:00
Jaeden Amero ad88be05b6 Add ChangeLog entry for #2371 2019-01-30 13:19:01 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 730ecdf3b1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2371' into development 2019-01-30 13:15:40 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 92dd4d0307 ssl-opt.sh: add a test for "calc PSA finished" log to the PSA tests 2019-01-30 04:10:19 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 683d77e836 ssl_opt: check client and server output for PSA calc verify in PSA tests
Increase debug level to 2 in PSA tests and check for "PSA calc verify"
to ensure that the PSA code is being run.
2019-01-30 03:50:42 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 2ad229725c ssl_tls: add psa_hash_abort when reseting checksum 2019-01-30 03:32:12 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 972fba51ed ssl_tls: rename sha_512_psa to sha_384_psa 2019-01-30 03:29:12 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek eb342241a5 ssl_tls: use PSA to compute running handshake hash for TLS 1.2 2019-01-29 09:14:33 -05:00
k-stachowiak f4ab6b21bd Improve wording in the ChangeLog 2019-01-29 11:55:11 +01:00
Hanno Becker 62efb9c3ba Update crypto submodule to merge commit of sibling PR 2019-01-29 10:14:20 +00:00
k-stachowiak 21daa3c1ee Reduce the timing tests complexity 2019-01-29 10:19:49 +01:00
Hanno Becker ccf574e030 Fix outdated comment in ecdsa_verify_wrap() 2019-01-29 08:26:15 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 2d4faa6afa ssl_tls: remove redundant status check 2019-01-29 03:14:15 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 2f76075b78 ssl_tls: adjust to the new key policy initialization and key allocation 2019-01-28 08:08:15 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek ac5dc3423a Fix key allocation for tls_prf_generic 2019-01-28 07:49:56 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 3317126819 ssl_tls: add missing return brackets 2019-01-28 07:49:56 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 70737ca827 ssl_tls: add key destruction upon generator failure 2019-01-28 07:49:56 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c929a82a6b Implement tls_prf_generic using the PSA API 2019-01-28 07:49:56 -05:00
Jaeden Amero 7b9575c654 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/2376' into development-psa
Resolve conflict in updating crypto submodule by manually pointing the
submodule to 2169a5e54d ("PSA: Adapt pk.c, pk_wrap.c, cipher.c to new
key policy init API").
2019-01-28 12:28:49 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 5615dabeef ssl_tls: remove line breaks from a debug message 2019-01-28 07:04:19 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek e85414edd0 ssl-opt: add a check for PSA computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange 2019-01-28 07:04:19 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 814feffd15 Whitespace, logging and documentation fixes
Introduce a psa_status_t status to handle return values.
Add a debug message with API usage description.
2019-01-28 07:04:19 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek d6db9be598 Adapt mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2 to PSA hashing 2019-01-28 07:04:19 -05:00
Hanno Becker af01b4b387 Update crypto submodule to sibling commit 2019-01-28 11:47:25 +00:00
Hanno Becker a98511164f Adapt ecdsa_verify_wrap() to new EC public key format
Previously, PSA used SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures to serialize EC public keys.
This has recently been changed to using ECPoint structures instead, but the wrapper
making PSA ECDSA verification available through Mbed TLS' PK API hasn't yet been
adapted accordingly - which is what this commit does.

Luckily, Mbed TLS' PK API offers two functions mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey()
and mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(), the latter exporting a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure and the former exporting an ECPoint structure in case of EC public
keys. For the adaptation of the ECDSA wrapper ecdsa_verify_wrap() it is therefore
sufficient to use mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() instead of mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der().
2019-01-28 11:45:19 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2192c27720 Update crypto submodule to sibling PR 2019-01-25 15:18:46 +00:00
Hanno Becker f99c2ec9d7 PSA: Adapt pk.c, pk_wrap.c, cipher.c to new key policy init API 2019-01-25 14:36:07 +00:00
Hanno Becker e34f636f8d PSA: Adapt cipher.c, pk.c, pk_wrap.c to new key slot allocation API 2019-01-25 14:31:06 +00:00
Hanno Becker 32809e8c70 PSA: Adapt ssl_server2 to modified key allocation API 2019-01-25 14:31:00 +00:00
Hanno Becker 9bd8842c77 PSA: Adapt ssl_server2 to hew key policy initialization API 2019-01-25 14:27:01 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1387124c89 PSA: Adapt ssl_client2 to new key policy initialization API 2019-01-25 14:26:26 +00:00
Hanno Becker 37519ea5f8 PSA: Adapt ssl_client2 to modified key slot allocation API 2019-01-25 14:26:01 +00:00
Hanno Becker 8d865dfe37 PSA: Adapt PK test suite to new key policy initialization API 2019-01-25 14:25:16 +00:00
Hanno Becker 353295ac70 PSA: Adapt PK test suite to modified key slot allocation mechanism 2019-01-25 14:25:00 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4a2949ba29 Update crypto submodule
Includes PRs #6, #18, #19.
2019-01-25 14:23:06 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 4b5686537f Update crypto version to use new key allocation 2019-01-25 03:16:49 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 4687ea0271 Revert .gitmodules update - point back to development 2019-01-25 03:15:37 -05:00
Antonin Décimo 36e89b5b71 Fix #2370, minor typos and spelling mistakes 2019-01-24 10:37:40 +01:00
Andrzej Kurek dae1768de7 Update .gitmodules file to point to a sibling branch in mbed-crypto 2019-01-23 06:38:45 -05:00
Simon Butcher 8e763329ad Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2040' into development 2019-01-23 10:28:25 +01:00
Simon Butcher 442ca5710b Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/1375' into development 2019-01-23 10:27:05 +01:00
Simon Butcher a3c821d143 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2319' into development 2019-01-23 10:21:05 +01:00
Simon Butcher 38cb940692 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2231' into development 2019-01-23 10:20:08 +01:00
Simon Butcher 0999ca3063 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2326' into development 2019-01-23 10:19:25 +01:00
Simon Butcher d4e327c4ff Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2345' into development 2019-01-23 10:14:52 +01:00
Simon Butcher d253bb49e7 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2352' into development-psa 2019-01-23 09:43:50 +01:00
Andrzej Kurek c847d9ff8d Change PSA submodule url 2019-01-22 07:13:10 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 7deba18576 Remove unnecessary "#" sign from PSA macros 2019-01-22 06:29:45 -05:00
Jeffrey Martin 801217e057
update ChangLog credit
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Martin <Jeffrey_Martin@rapid7.com>
2019-01-16 09:25:36 -06:00
Jeffrey Martin d20a0e2d9f
update ChangLog per comments
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Martin <Jeffrey_Martin@rapid7.com>
2019-01-15 09:01:31 -06:00
Andrzej Kurek e57c1ea80a Switch to the public crypto submodule url 2019-01-15 09:52:56 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c0a1be08a0 Fix indentation of documentation 2019-01-15 03:33:35 -05:00
Jeffrey Martin d25fd8d4c9
MIPS register hints without $ for compatibility
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Martin <Jeffrey_Martin@rapid7.com>
2019-01-14 18:01:40 -06:00
Jeffrey Martin a661be3593
Add fix of #1722 to ChangLog
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Martin <Jeffrey_Martin@rapid7.com>
2019-01-14 16:40:59 -06:00
Jeffrey Martin 2f70e4b2f9
add hints for mips registers that may need restore
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Martin <Jeffrey_Martin@rapid7.com>
2019-01-14 16:40:18 -06:00
Andrzej Kurek 62594a8b12 pk_wrap: pass curve size instead of a larger size of the exported key
Whitespace fixes
2019-01-14 05:14:18 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 93a38a3101 pk: wrap curve_id before passing it to PSA
Add a helper function in PSA utils
2019-01-14 05:09:46 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek a62a58ece5 cipher: fixed key ownership scope
Indicate key ownership earlier, so that it gets destroyed on faulty policy setting.
2019-01-14 05:01:28 -05:00
Simon Butcher 02b453e5b8 Update crypto submodule for PSA PR#229
Update the crypto submodule to include the PR#229 'storage: Correct typo of
PSA_PS_ERROR_OFFSET' which has a corresponding fix in Mbed OS 5.11, and is
required for Mbed OS to build.
2019-01-10 15:17:31 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1b6d2b228d Adapt ChangeLog 2019-01-10 09:22:16 +00:00
Hanno Becker a9375b35c0 Avoid MSVC compiler warning
MSVC warns about use of unary `-` operator on unsigned integers.
2019-01-10 09:21:24 +00:00
Hanno Becker 783f9c3514 Fix signed-to-unsigned integer conversion warning in X.509 module
Fixes #2212.
2019-01-10 09:21:24 +00:00
Ron Eldor a81f3bd297 Add entry describing the bug fix
Add entry describing the bug fix in `mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey()`.
2019-01-10 10:49:02 +02:00
Ron Eldor adb5234aa9 Return error code of underlying function.
Return the error code if failed, instead of returning value `1`.
If not failed, return the call of the underlying function,
in `mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey()`.
2019-01-10 10:47:42 +02:00
Simon Butcher 62ec2dd68f Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/975' into development 2019-01-08 16:28:08 +00:00
Simon Butcher 8de0501871 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2128' into development 2019-01-08 16:23:57 +00:00
Simon Butcher 6944e05956 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2232' into development 2019-01-08 15:33:28 +00:00
Simon Butcher 012a06cbf6 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2228' into development 2019-01-08 15:26:58 +00:00
Simon Butcher 2fac661a1d Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2321' into development 2019-01-08 15:22:42 +00:00
Simon Butcher d4548ae474 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2334' into development 2019-01-08 15:21:41 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek 2349c4db88 Adapt to the new key allocation mechanism 2019-01-08 09:36:01 -05:00
k-stachowiak 6b5ef48bf7 Add a configuration fix for vsnprintf for non-conforming platforms 2019-01-07 16:53:29 +01:00
Darryl Green eb7f1b54c9 Add ChangeLog entry 2019-01-07 13:05:37 +00:00
Darryl Green a7064c3b8c Move ecp_restartable definitions out of the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT guards
As there are some definitions that are defined regardless of
whether MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE is defined or not, these definitions
need to be moved outside the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT guards. This is a simple
move as MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE are mutually
exclusive options.
2019-01-07 10:23:34 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek a49a94a536 Updating PSA submodule to commit 9e0feff 2019-01-04 05:15:20 -05:00
amisare 5c0b5b53a3
Update ChangeLog 2019-01-04 08:15:46 +08:00
Ron Eldor 4896c6bee5
Update ChangeLog
Co-Authored-By: amisare <243297288@qq.com>
2019-01-04 07:47:05 +08:00
Hanno Becker 0e810b9648 Don't call memcpy with NULL pointer in mbedtls_mpi_read_binary()
mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() calls memcpy() with the source pointer being
the source pointer passed to mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(), the latter may
be NULL if the buffer length is 0 (and this happens e.g. in the ECJPAKE
test suite). The behavior of memcpy(), in contrast, is undefined when
called with NULL source buffer, even if the length of the copy operation
is 0.

This commit fixes this by explicitly checking that the source pointer is
not NULL before calling memcpy(), and skipping the call otherwise.
2019-01-03 17:13:11 +00:00
Masashi Honma fbda6126d6 Remove duplicate #include
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
2019-01-03 16:13:11 +09:00
Hanno Becker 9f6d16ad79 Fix preprocessor macro existence check in bignum.c 2019-01-02 17:15:06 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6dab6200c6 Fix typo after rebase 2019-01-02 16:42:29 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5d91c0bbee Add missing macro existence check in byte swapping code in bignum.c 2019-01-02 11:38:14 +00:00
Hanno Becker f872007782 Optimize mpi_bigendian_to_host() for speed and size
Use GCC / Clang builtins for byte swapping.
2019-01-02 11:38:14 +00:00
Hanno Becker 8116ef7c81 Adapt ChangeLog 2019-01-02 11:38:14 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2be8a55f72 Change signature of mpi_bigendian_to_host() to reflect usage 2019-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
Hanno Becker da1655a48e Remove temporary stack-buffer from mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()
Context: The function `mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()` uses a temporary stack
buffer to hold the random data before reading it into the target MPI.

Problem: This is inefficient both computationally and memory-wise.
Memory-wise, it may lead to a stack overflow on constrained devices with
limited stack.

Fix: This commit introduces the following changes to get rid of the
temporary stack buffer entirely:

1. It modifies the call to the PRNG to output the random data directly
   into the target MPI's data buffer.

This alone, however, constitutes a change of observable behaviour:
The previous implementation guaranteed to interpret the bytes emitted by
the PRNG in a big-endian fashion, while rerouting the PRNG output into the
target MPI's limb array leads to an interpretation that depends on the
endianness of the host machine.
As a remedy, the following change is applied, too:

2. Reorder the bytes emitted from the PRNG within the target MPI's
   data buffer to ensure big-endian semantics.

Luckily, the byte reordering was already implemented as part of
`mbedtls_mpi_read_binary()`, so:

3. Extract bigendian-to-host byte reordering from
   `mbedtls_mpi_read_binary()` to a separate internal function
   `mpi_bigendian_to_host()` to be used by `mbedtls_mpi_read_binary()`
   and `mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()`.
2019-01-02 11:37:25 +00:00
Ron Eldor 0caddf770f Update the LTS branch list in the contributing doc
1. Remove the reference to `mbedtls-2.1` since it's End Of Life.
2. Add reference to `mbedtls-2.16` since it's a new LTS branch.
2019-01-02 10:58:25 +02:00
GuHaijun f81f41a3b5 Fix ChangeLog formate 2018-12-28 18:28:18 +08:00
GuHaijun a306979ce1 Fix ChangeLog formate 2018-12-28 14:06:29 +08:00
GuHaijun f7e742d3ce Update ChangeLog 2018-12-28 13:22:33 +08:00
GuHaijun 983acb75f0 Fix include file path 2018-12-28 11:11:10 +08:00
Ron Eldor 9cbd1b2ecd Include configuration file for all headers
Include the configuration file for all headers that were not
included, and for new headers introduced.
2018-12-16 12:14:37 +02:00
Ron Eldor 8b0cf2e76f Include configuration file to headers
Add inclusion to configration file in header files,
instead of relying on other header files to include
the configuration file. This issue resolves #1371
2018-12-16 12:02:50 +02:00
Jaeden Amero 3e24c26899 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-public/pr/2218' into development-psa 2018-12-06 16:15:44 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 5dfca1e1bd Update library version to 2.15.1 2018-12-01 18:44:29 +00:00
Simon Butcher 41f9519530 Update ChangeLog for Crypto submodule update 2018-12-01 18:44:29 +00:00
Gilles Peskine 7d6f48a058 Update crypto submodule with compilation guard fixes for CCM and GCM 2018-11-28 18:42:22 +01:00
Ron Eldor b9b3813649 Separate REGEX of MACRO to groups
Seperate the REGEX into identifier, condition and value, into groups,
to behandled differently.
2018-11-27 16:37:49 +02:00
Ron Eldor 111ba0e949 Fix parsing error of test data
Fix parsing error that contains special character.
The previous implementation replaced the `:` char with `\n`,
and split on `\n`. Test data containing strings with `\n`
were split as well. Fixes #2193.
The split function caused strings containing `\:` to add
another escape char, resulting in `\\:`. This caused the
tests with the `\:` in the string data to fail.
The fix doesn't replace with `\n`, but splits all `:` that
are not preceded with `\`. After that, removes the preceding `\` char.
2018-11-27 13:48:13 +02:00
Ron Eldor 8a6917dc67 Update ChangeLog
Update the ChangeLog with the fix.
2018-11-27 10:37:02 +02:00
Ron Eldor a16fa297f7 Refactor mpi_write_hlp to not be recursive
Refactor `mpi_write_hlp()` to not be recursive, to fix stack overflows.
Iterate over the `mbedtls_mpi` division of the radix requested,
until it is zero. Each iteration, put the residue in the next LSB
of the output buffer. Fixes #2190
2018-11-27 10:34:36 +02:00
Andres Amaya Garcia 687d6739b2 Fix resource leak of file desc in test code 2018-11-26 21:23:28 +00:00
Ron Eldor d5062dedeb Add conditional dependency to tests
Add a way to check compile time defionitions values, for determining
whether to skip tests.
2018-11-26 14:23:14 +02:00
Ron Eldor 822b834bdf Update ChangeLog
Add an entry in ChangeLog describing the fix.
2018-11-25 10:38:34 +02:00
Ron Eldor 6dbb9aabf8 Test AD too long only when CCM_ALT not defined
Since the AD too long is a limitation on Mbed TLS,
HW accelerators may support this. Run the test for AD too long,
only if `MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT` is not defined.
Addresses comment in #1996.
2018-11-25 10:31:53 +02:00
Simon Butcher 5f62a5731c Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2226' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 22:11:37 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 3aad836e36 Update crypto submodule to mbedcrypto-0.1.0b 2018-11-23 21:39:32 +00:00
Simon Butcher 60ee838a8a Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2224' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 21:18:32 +00:00
Jaeden Amero bb225f7914 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-public/pr/2225' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 17:37:04 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 720d9a6056 psa: Update submodule to include CMake fix
CMake with ASan would fail when building crypto as a submodule. The latest
version of the submodule has a fix for this error.
2018-11-23 16:06:29 +00:00
Jaeden Amero b1c48d3d83 psa: Include PSA headers for tests and programs
Programs and tests need to be able to use PSA header files when
USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO are set. Add the crypto
submodule include folder, which contains psa headers, after the main
include folder so that psa headers can be found and crypto submodule
headers don't take precedence over mbedtls headers.
2018-11-23 15:22:44 +00:00
Hanno Becker ee81756a51 Fix wrong cmake invocation in all.sh testing MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
It should be `cmake -D VAR=1` instead of `cmake -D VAR`.
2018-11-23 15:08:32 +00:00
Simon Butcher ebeb6cb446 Update library version to 2.15.0 2018-11-23 14:18:15 +00:00
Hanno Becker 46b79c14ad Merge remote-tracking branch 'remote_jaeden/dev/patater/avoid-check-files-todo-dev' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 13:40:44 +00:00
Hanno Becker cdb31172e7 Temporarily update crypto-submodule target branch
This is a temporary commit to allow us to test this
proposed branch against the sibling proposed branch
on mbedtls-psa.
2018-11-23 13:38:38 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3441d2e4a4 Merge branch 'iotssl-2597-psa-hashing-x509' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:42:07 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4ae8b497c0 Merge branch 'iotssl-2578-psa-sig-verification' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:37:00 +00:00
Hanno Becker a0a96a0c56 Merge branch 'psa_cipher_integration' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:26:57 +00:00
Hanno Becker f8b5f27bce Merge branch 'psa_cipher' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:18:02 +00:00
Hanno Becker 485529952f Merge branch 'opaque_psk_implementation' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:12:38 +00:00
Hanno Becker b345ae64f1 Merge branch 'iotssl-2596-opaque-csr-creation' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 11:05:04 +00:00
Hanno Becker ee618f7241 Merge branch 'iotssl-2574-pk-opaque-tls' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 10:31:00 +00:00
Hanno Becker 9aa921f336 Merge branch 'iotssl-2580-pk-opaque-psa' into development-psa-proposed 2018-11-23 10:17:36 +00:00
Andrzej Kurek b7f3ac6504 pkwrite: add an explicit cast to size_t 2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 967cfd18fd Remove trailing whitespace 2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 158c3d10d0 pkwrite: add a safety check before calculating the buffer size 2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 4b11407258 Cosmetic changes
Adjust whitespaces, reduce test dependencies and reduce buffer size passed by 1.
2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 5f7bad34bb Add CSR write testing using opaque keys
Parse and verify CSR programatically instead of using predetermined data,
to not tamper with randomness in tests.
2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 5fec0860f9 pkwrite: add opaque key handling for public key exporting
Return early from mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der - public opaque key
exporting is expected to contain all of the needed data, therefore it shouldn't
be written again.
2018-11-22 12:05:08 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 8b38ff57ab Remove trailing whitespace 2018-11-22 11:53:04 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek a609337ca0 x509: remove unnecessary calls to psa_hash_abort
According to the documentation, it does not need to be called after a failed
psa_hash call.
2018-11-22 11:53:04 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek d4a6553191 x509: use the PSA API to perform hashing operations
So far limited only to certificate verification withour CRL and CSR generation.
2018-11-22 11:53:04 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek ad5d58124a pk_wrap.c: fix length mismatch check placement 2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek eeac03b354 pk_wrap.c: tidy up signature extraction
Add a sanity check for signature length, remove superfluous bounds check.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 6cb63aa010 Cosmetic changes
Move memset to a more relevant spot, fix one whitespace error
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 9241d18773 pk_wrap: rework and tidy up signature extraction
Improve comments, use a normal buffer instead of mbedtls_asn1_buf,
remove unneeded variables and use shared utilities where possible.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek b6016c52c5 pk_wrap: reuse a static buffer for signature extraction
Use a buffer left over after importing a key to hold an extracted signature.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek b7b0478f76 pk_wrap: rework signature extraction to work with small r and s values
There is a probability that r will be encoded as 31 or less bytes in DER,
so additional padding is added in such case.
Added a signature-part extraction function to tidy up the code further.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2baae9ef71 Add tests for ECDSA verify with short r, s values
This is intended to test transcoding the signature to the format expected by
PSA (fixed-length encoding of r, s) when r and s have respectively:
- full length with initial null byte
- full length without initial null byte
- non-full length with initial null byte
- non-full length without initial null byte

The signatures were generated using:

programs/pkey/pk_sign tests/data_files/server5.key foo

where foo is an empty file, and with a variant of one of the following patches
applied:

diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index abac015cebc6..e4a27b044516 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -305,7 +305,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
                 goto cleanup;
             }
+            printf("\ngenerating r...\n");

+gen:
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
@@ -317,6 +319,11 @@ mul:
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
                                                   f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
+
+            size_t bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( pr );
+            printf("%zu ", bits);
+            if( bits != 255 )
+                goto gen;
         }
         while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );

or:

diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c
index abac015cebc6..d704376e0c42 100644
--- a/library/ecdsa.c
+++ b/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -305,7 +305,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
                 goto cleanup;
             }
+            printf("\ngenerating r...\n");

+gen:
             MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );

 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
@@ -353,6 +355,11 @@ modn:
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
+
+            size_t bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( s );
+            printf("%zu ", bits);
+            if( bits != 247 )
+                goto gen;
     }
     while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );

with the value edited manually between each run to get the desired bit length.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 4f0253962e pk_wrap: improve error codes returned from ecdsa_verify_wrap
Use the shared PSA utilities to translate errors.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 2122774d72 pk_wrap: switch to helper functions defined in psa_util.h
Remove duplicated helper functions.
Remove an unnecessary call to psa_crypto_init().
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek c05ec9f39c pk_wrap: test if a valid md_alg is passed to ecdsa_verify_wrap
Adjust tests to pass a valid algorithm
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek cef91afab6 pk_wrap: destroy key slot on errors with policy or key importing 2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 3f864c2457 pk_wrap: add a check for equal signature parts 2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek b3d1b12177 pk_wrap: check if curve conversion is successful 2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek ea84233e02 pk_wrap: nullify the signature pointer on error in extract_ecdsa_sig
Fix a double free error in ecdsa_verify_wrap
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 6376d638b8 pk_wrap: cosmetic changes
Adjust whitespaces and variable names
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Andrzej Kurek 8b036a6082 pk_wrap.c: add support for ecdsa signature verification using PSA
Use PSA internally to verify signatures.
Add a conversion to a raw signature format.
2018-11-22 11:17:37 -05:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard cfdf8f4d8f Implement key_opaque option to ssl_client2 2018-11-22 14:35:11 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard ef68be4553 Add option key_opaque to ssl_client2 (skeleton)
This is just the plumbing for the option itself, implementation of the option
will be the next commit.
2018-11-22 14:35:11 +00:00
Hanno Becker e9420c2aff Rename PSA test in ssl-opt.sh 2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker a0dc9cf8ec Remove superfluous quotes in ssl-opt.sh 2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker cb1cc80cf5 Use PSA-based ciphers for record protections in TLS-1.2 only
Reasons:
- For the first release, we attempt to support TLS-1.2 only,
- At least TLS-1.0 is known to not work at the moment, as
  for CBC ciphersuites the code in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf()
  and mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf() assumes that mbedtls_cipher_crypt()
  updates the structure field for the IV in the cipher context,
  which the PSA-based implementation currently doesn't.
2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker 679d8ceb13 Use PSA-based ciphers for SSL ticket protection
This commit modifies the default SSL ticket implementation
from `library/ssl_ticket.c` to use PSA-based cipher context
for ticket creation and parsing.

As in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() adapted in an earlier commit,
we allow fallback to the ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup()
if the provided cipher is not known. We do this even though
we always call mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup() with AES-GCM
in our own code since this function is public and might
be used with other ciphers by users.
2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker d140d0828e Introduce macros for constants in SSL ticket implementation 2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker 9b5853c846 Add runs for specific PSA-supported ciphersuites to ssl-opt.sh
So far, make sure we test the following ciphersuites
without any fallback to non-PSA ciphers:

TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256
TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384
2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker 9d76d56d81 Omit tests from ssl-opt.sh which force a disabled ciphersuite 2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker f704befee8 Setup PSA-based cipher context in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys()
This commit changes the code path in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys()
responsible for setting up record protection cipher contexts
to attempt to use the new API mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa() in
case MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is set.

For that, the AEAD tag length must be provided, which is already
computed earlier in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() and only needs to be
stored a function scope to be available for mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa().

If mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa() fails cleanly indicating that the
requested cipher is not supported in PSA, we fall through to
the default setup using mbedtls_cipher_setup(). However, we print
a debug message in this case, to allow catching the fallthrough in
tests where we know we're using a cipher which should be supported
by PSA.
2018-11-22 14:05:54 +00:00
Hanno Becker 7909c4c875 Improve doc wording of PSA status field of mbedtls_cipher_context_t 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker a654c3e38a Return 'Feature unavailable' error for ciphers unsupported by PSA 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 115e1a4e5b Don't use multiline comments in enums to silence check-names.sh
The sanity checking script tests/scripts/check-names.sh uses a
simple state machine paired with a sequence of `sed` commands to
extract enumeration constants from the code. This code, however,
doesn't work properly when using multiline comments in enumerations
such as recently done in the constants MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_XXX.

This commit doesn't attempt to make check-names.sh more robust
but instead uses /* ... */ comment indicators in each comment line,
while silences check-names.sh.

Increasing the robustness of check-names.sh is instead tracked
in #2210.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker b1b2c01df4 Add missing newline at the end of test_suite_cipher.gcm.data 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 625f94b2fd Minor rewording in documentation of PSA-based cipher context 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker ce61a32e6a Use enum for slot state in PSA-based cipher context 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 8d88a6e20d Check support for cipher in mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()
mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa() should return
MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE when the requested
cipher is not supported by PSA, so that the caller can
try the original mbedtls_cipher_setup() instead.

The previous version of mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(), however,
only attempted to translate the cipher mode (GCM, CCM, CBC,
ChaChaPoly, Stream), but didn't consider the underlying
cipher primitive. Hence, it wouldn't fail when attempting
to setup a cipher context for, say, 3DES-CBC, where CBC
is currently supported by PSA but 3DES isn't.

This commit adds a check to mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()
for whether the requested cipher primitive is available
in the underlying PSA Crypto implementation, and fails
cleanly with MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if
it is isn't.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker b0c05e242c Test PSA-based GCM cipher operations 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5cec718191 Adapt existing Cipher-GCM test cases to new param for auth_crypt_tv 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker a13272d6d2 Test PSA-based CCM cipher operations 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 56150afd1a Implement PSA-based AEAD enc/dec cipher operations 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker f133640475 Add AEAD tag length to new mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()
For AEAD ciphers, the information contained in mbedtls_cipher_info
is not enough to deduce a PSA algorithm value of type psa_algorithm_t.
This is because mbedtls_cipher_info doesn't contain the AEAD tag
length, while values of type psa_algorithm_t do.

This commit adds the AEAD tag length as a separate parameter
to mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). For Non-AEAD ciphers, the value
must be 0.

This approach is preferred over passing psa_algorithm_t directly
in order to keep the changes in existing code using the cipher layer
small.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 884f6af590 Always configure PSA-based keys for encryption and decryption
Mbed TLS cipher layer allows usage of keys for other purposes
than indicated in the `operation` parameter of `mbedtls_cipher_setkey()`.
The semantics of the PSA Crypto API, in contrast, checks key
usage against the key policy.

As a remedy, this commit modifies the PSA key slot setup to
always allow both encryption and decryption.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker e43164e8f1 Add AES-*-CBC test vectors for PSA-based cipher contexts 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3c852a9c35 Implement PSA-based version of mbedtls_cipher_crypt() 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker d9ca5cfd60 Implement mbedtls_cipher_setkey() for PSA-based cipher contexts
This commit implements the internal key slot management performed
by PSA-based cipher contexts. Specifically, `mbedtls_cipher_setkey()`
wraps the provided raw key material into a key slot, and
`mbedtls_cipher_free()` destroys that key slot.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 73f59fc3e9 Add PSA-specific cipher context 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1cb36530be Add psa_enabled field to cipher ctx and add dummy implementations
This field determines whether a cipher context should
use an external implementation of the PSA Crypto API for
cryptographic operations, or Mbed TLS' own crypto library.

The commit also adds dummy implementations for the cipher API.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 098c9de2af Add declaration and dummy-definition of mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa() 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker b1f0872ce6 Improve wording in documentation of mbedtls_cipher_setup() 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker d7503a72d0 Expand documentation of mbedtls_cipher_list() 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 21967c5bff Fix style in cipher.c 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker f4fb876be9 Fix style in cipher.h 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker c3d25b31ab Fix style in NUM_CIPHERS definition in cipher_wrap.c
Use brackets around `sizeof()` arguments as well as the entire macro.
2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker e5a0450809 Fix style in definition of mbedtls_cipher_mode_t 2018-11-22 14:03:39 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6767cca100 Merge branch 'gcm_through_cipher_api_tests' into psa_cipher_ 2018-11-22 14:03:14 +00:00
Hanno Becker c0c882cd67 Add missing dependencies in test_suite_cipher.gcm 2018-11-22 13:41:53 +00:00
Hanno Becker f79aa9e3ca Adapt ChangeLog 2018-11-22 13:41:53 +00:00
Hanno Becker ef42f22edd Add NIST AES GCM test vectors to single-step cipher API test suite
The test suites `test_suite_gcm.aes{128,192,256}_en.data` contains
numerous NIST test vectors for AES-*-GCM against which the GCM
API mbedtls_gcm_xxx() is tested.

However, one level higher at the cipher API, no tests exist which
exercise mbedtls_cipher_auth_{encrypt/decrypt}() for GCM ciphers,
although test_suite_cipher.function contains the test auth_crypt_tv
which does precisely that and is already used e.g. in
test_suite_cipher.ccm.

This commit replicates the test vectors from
test_suite_gcm.aes{128,192,256}_en.data in test_suite_cipher.gcm.data
and adds a run of auth_crypt_tv for each of them.

The conversion was mainly done through the sed command line

```
s/gcm_decrypt_and_verify:\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):
\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\):\([^:]*\)/auth_crypt_tv:
\1:\2:\4:\5:\3:\7:\8:\9/
```
2018-11-22 13:41:07 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 23a1ccd23f Fix test that wasn't actually effective
psa_destroy_key() returns success even if the slot is empty.
2018-11-22 12:21:20 +01:00
Hanno Becker e10f191543 Remove MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM from config.pl
This configuration option has been removed by now.
2018-11-22 09:43:35 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard fa9a1ca967 Improve description of a test 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 347a00e07e Add test utility function: wrap_as_opaque()
The new function is not tested here, but will be in a subsequent PR.
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 59eecb0e9e Guard against PSA generating invalid signature
The goal is not to double-check everything PSA does, but to ensure that it
anything goes wrong, we fail cleanly rather than by overwriting a buffer.
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 9a5a77ba7c Use shared function for error translation 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 45013a1d54 Fix a compliance issue in signature encoding
The issue is not present in the normal path because asn1write_mpi() does it
automatically, but we're not using that here...
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 509aff111f Improve documentation of an internal function 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard d8454bc515 Get rid of large stack buffers in PSA sign wrapper 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2f2b396b7a Add new macro to detemine ECDSA signature length
Revived from a previous PR by Gilles, see:
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/1293/files#diff-568ef321d275f2035b8b26a70ee9af0bR71

This will be useful in eliminating temporary stack buffers for transcoding the
signature: in order to do that in place we need to be able to make assumptions
about the size of the output buffer, which this macro will provide. (See next
commit.)
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 392dc045c9 Improve documentation of mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque() 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 69baf70984 Align names to use "opaque" only everywhere
It's better for names in the API to describe the "what" (opaque keys) rather
than the "how" (using PSA), at least since we don't intend to have multiple
function doing the same "what" in different ways in the foreseeable future.
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 3686771dfa Implement pk_sign() for opaque ECDSA keys 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard d97390e97d Add tests for unsupported operations/functions 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 920c063bad Implement can_do for opaque ECC keypairs
Unfortunately the can_do wrapper does not receive the key context as an
argument, so it cannot check psa_get_key_information(). Later we might want to
change our internal structures to fix this, but for now we'll just restrict
opaque PSA keys to be ECDSA keypairs, as this is the only thing we need for
now. It also simplifies testing a bit (no need to test each key type).
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 0184b3c69b Add support for get_(bit)len on opaque keys 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 01a12c49aa Add key generation to opaque test function
While at it, clarify who's responsible for destroying the underlying key. That
can't be us because some keys cannot be destroyed and we wouldn't know. So
let's leave that up to the caller.
2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 7b5fe041f1 Implement alloc/free wrappers for pk_opaque_psa 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard eaeb7b23ff Clarify return value of pk_check_pair() 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 20678b2ae2 Skeleton for PK_OPAQUE_PSA 2018-11-22 09:59:34 +01:00
Hanno Becker c44e0a4bd1 Initialize PSA key slot as invalid in ssl_client2.c
Otherwise, if `mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot()` fails to find a fresh
key slot, the slot value will be undefined, and the call to
`psa_destroy_key()` at the end of `main()` is undefined behavior.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 7390c71609 Share code for PSK identity configuration
This commit shares the code for setting the PSK identity hint between
the functions mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker f9a3287b7f Fix typo in documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1d911cd59d Automatically allocate opaque PSK key slots in ssl_{client/server}2
Previously, command line arguments `psk_slot` and `psk_list_slot`
could be used to indicate the PSA key slots that the example
applications should use to store the PSK(s) provided.

This commit changes this approach to use the utility function
`mbedtls_psa_get_free_key_slot()` to obtain free key slots from
the PSA Crypto implementation automatically, so that users only
need to pass boolean flags `psk_opaque` and `psk_list_opaque`
on the command line to enable / disable PSA-based opaque PSKs.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker c43b6ea847 Destroy PSA-based temporary opaque PSKs at the end of ssl_server2 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 3f24ea976d Destroy PSA-based temporary opaque PSK key at the end of ssl_client2 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5cd607bf2e Remove overly long line in ssl_client2.c 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker a63ac3f149 Safe-guard ssl_conf_remove_psk() for simultaneous raw-opaque PSKs
The code maintains the invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never
configured simultaneously, so strictly speaking `ssl_conf_remove_psk()`
need not consider clearing the raw PSK if it has already cleared an
opaque one - and previously, it didn't. However, it doesn't come at
any cost to keep this check as a safe-guard to future unforeseen
situations where opaque and raw PSKs _are_ both present.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker f9ed7d5f76 Don't use 48 as a magic number in ssl_derive_keys()
In multiple places, it occurrs as the fixed length of
the master secret, so use a constant with a descriptive
name instead. This is reinforced by the fact the some
further occurrences of '48' are semantically different.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker c1385c104f Don't use idiom if( func() ) but always add explicit value check 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 463194d47a Fix typo in documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_opaque_psk() 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 28c79dc3d0 Add tests to ssl-opt.sh exercising server-side opaque PSK 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 845b946d92 Add server-support for opaque PSKs 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 520224e577 Rename ssl_conf_has_[raw_]_psk to ssl_conf_has_static_[raw_]psk
This is to differentiate the function from the functions relevant
on the server-side, which also need to take into the PSK callback.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker b64ba5f2c0 Add support for opaque PSKs to ssl_server2 example application
This commit adds command line parameters `psk_slot` and `psk_list_slot`
to the example application `programs/ssl/ssl_server2`. These have the
following semantics:

- `psk_slot`: The same semantics as for the `ssl_client2` example
   application. That is, if a PSK is configured through the use
   of the command line parameters `psk` and `psk_identity`, then
   `psk_slot=X` can be used to import the PSK into PSA key slot X
   and registering it statically with the SSL configuration through
   the new API call mbedtls_ssl_conf_hs_opaque().
- `psk_list_slot`: In addition to the static PSK registered in the
   the SSL configuration, servers can register a callback for picking
   the PSK corresponding to the PSK identity that the client chose.
   The `ssl_server2` example application uses such a callback to select
   the PSK from a list of PSKs + Identities provided through the
   command line parameter `psk_list`, and to register the selected
   PSK via `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk()`. In this case, the new parameter
   `psk_list_slot=X` has the effect of registering all PSKs provided in
   in `psk_list` as PSA keys in the key slots starting from slot `X`,
   and having the PSK selection callback register the chosen PSK
   through the new API function `mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()`.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker f7027514fb Add tests to ssl-opt.sh exercising client-side opaque PSK 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker afd311ee12 Skip PMS generation on client if opaque PSK is used
For opaque PSKs, the PSK-to-MS expansion is performed atomatically
on the PSA-side.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 7d0a569d38 Implement PSA-based PSK-to-MS derivation in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 35b23c7484 Simplify master secret derivation in mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker dfab8e221a Allow opaque PSKs in pure-PSK ciphersuites only
In contrast, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK and DHE-PSK are explicitly excluded
for the moment.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 2e4f616708 Don't suggest the use of a PSK suite if no PSK configured on client 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker e86964ca01 Add support for opaque PSKs in ssl_client2 example program
This commit adds support for the use of PSA-based opaque PSKs
in the TLS client example application programs/ssl/ssl_client2.

Specifically, a numerical command line option `psk_slot` with
the following constraints and semantics is added:
- It can only be used alongside the provisioning of a raw PSK
  through the preexisting `psk` command line option.
- It can only be used if both TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite
  are enforced through the appropriate use of the `min_version`
  and `force_ciphersuite` command line options.
- If the previous conditions are met, setting `psk_slot=d` will
  result in the PSA key slot with identifier `d` being populated
  with the raw PSK data specified through the `psk` parameter
  and passed to Mbed TLS via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`
  prior to the handshake.

Enforcing the TLS version and ciphersuite is necessary to determine
the exact KDF algorithm the PSK will be used for. This is required
as it is currently not possible to set up a key without specifying
exactly one algorithm the key may be used with.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker d20a8ca733 Implement API for configuration of opaque PSKs
This commit adds implementations of the two new API functions

mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque().
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4363313976 Add opaque PSK identifier to SSL configuration 2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker d9f7d43b5f Add opaque PSK identifier to mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
This commit adds a field `psk_opaque` to the handshake parameter
struct `mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params` which indicates if the user
has configured the use of an opaque PSK.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 0228304b5f Add API for configuration of opaque PSK
This commit adds two public API functions

mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()

which allow to configure the use of opaque, PSA-maintained PSKs
at configuration time or run time.
2018-11-21 21:12:58 +00:00
Hanno Becker 6e02197e24 Refer to PSA through MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, not USE_PSA, in all.sh 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 4d30776826 Remove double white space 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 186b65ac61 Use MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H instead of MBEDTLS_PSA_COMPAT_H in psa_util.h
This is still an artifact from when psa_util.h was called psa_compat.h.
2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 51560b62ed State explicitly that any API depending on PSA is unstable 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker f0cd6191ef Update VisualC files 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker f5f9ea26bb Improve documentation of mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk() 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 010cf7eced Add AEAD tag length parameter to mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode()
In case of AEAD ciphers, the cipher mode (and not even the entire content
of mbedtls_cipher_info_t) doesn't uniquely determine a psa_algorithm_t
because it doesn't specify the AEAD tag length, which however is included
in psa_algorithm_t identifiers.

This commit adds a tag length value to mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode()
to account for that ambiguity.
2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 000334f398 Add function to translate PSA errors to PK module errors 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker afebf5a153 Fix Doxygen annotation in psa_util.h 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5a9942e7d2 Initialize PSA Crypto implementation in ssl_server2 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker b2b468ba45 Initialize PSA Crypto implementation in ssl_client2.c 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 1cfc5ddb11 Initialize PSA Crypto implementation at the start of each test suite 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker b26c1938d2 Make PSA utility functions static inline
Compilers warn about unused static functions.
2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5525126ed8 Add PSA-to-Mbed TLS translations for cipher module 2018-11-21 21:08:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 87837b2ec6 Add internal header for PSA utility functions
This commit adds the header file mbedtls/psa_util.h which contains
static utility functions `mbedtls_psa_xxx()` used in the integration
of PSA Crypto into Mbed TLS.

Warning: These functions are internal only and may change at any time.
2018-11-21 21:08:42 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 655c0a8d76 Add build using PSA to all.sh 2018-11-21 21:08:40 +00:00
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard aeefa49edd Add config option for X.509/TLS to use PSA 2018-11-21 21:03:14 +00:00
Simon Butcher 55517ae95f Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/pr/2146' into development-proposed 2018-11-21 16:27:47 +00:00
Gilles Peskine bc554f66ef Document Mbed Crypto and the PSA API
Briefly explain that this is experimental, and document how to try it out.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 3f6470a517 psa: Add ChangeLog entry for adding Mbed Crypto 2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero acaabe796e crypto: Test without crypto as a submodule
Add a test to ensure that when the crypto submodule is not used, the crypto
library is not created and that libmbedcrypto.a does not contain symbols
from files contained within the crypto submodule.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero ed93bdc8aa crypto: Test with crypto as a submodule
- Check that libmbedcrypto was not built at the top level.
- Check that we've built libmbedcrypto with the correct files. Build
  libmbedcrypto with debug symbols and verify that files used are from the
  crypto submodule.
- Check that config.h is handled properly. Enable a feature at the top
  level that the crypto library submodule has disabled in its config.h, and
  check that the library symboles indicate that the feature is present in
  libmbedcrypto.
- Ensure basic functionality of the resulting build with a run of
  `make test` and `ssl-opt.sh`.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero ffeb1b8ab6 abi_check: Update submodules
When grabbing a fresh copy of a branch, it's required to also fetch the
submodule. Add fetching the submodule to abi_check.py.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 7acb0cf01e abi_check: Allow checking current checkout
Without a "--detach" option, git worktree will refuse to checkout a branch
that's already checked out. This makes the abi_check.py script not very
useful for checking the currently checked out branch, as git will error
that the branch is already checked out. Add the "--detach" option to check
out the new temporary worktree in detached head mode. This is acceptable
because we aren't planning on working on the branch and just want a
checkout to do ABI checking from.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 484ee33c35 psa: Add PSA Crypto configuration
Add an option that can enable the exposure of PSA Crypto APIs from
libmbedcrypto.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 30b340a760 crypto: Add mbedtls-psa as a submodule
mbedtls-psa contains an implementation of libmbedcrypto, including the PSA
Crypto API.
2018-11-21 12:54:57 +00:00
Ron Eldor 8672cb7909 Set result to False on Failure
Add a member for holding a failed result,
and notify_complete with this member value, when finished.
2018-11-21 14:02:12 +02:00
Jaeden Amero 4cb814e3a7 cmake: Use finer grained include directory
Using finer grained control over include directories will allow differnt
targets to use different include files. This will be useful when the
`crypto` subcomponent wants to use its own include files instead of or in
addition to the top level ones.
2018-11-20 18:46:43 +00:00
Jaeden Amero 2d0e00fca8 all.sh: Cleanup CMakeFiles
all.sh's cleanup function would not entirely remove CMakeFiles due to a
missing -o in its fine command. Add a -o after prune, so that the find for
CMakeFiles can succeed.
2018-11-20 18:46:43 +00:00
Hanno Becker 5ddc063c88 Correct typo 2018-10-26 16:50:05 +01:00
Hanno Becker d0d01c584e Document psk_list parameter of ssl_server2 example program 2018-10-25 16:56:37 +01:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak 2cdb6b46be Include MinGW in the non-conforming (v)snprintf scope
It turns out that in some environments MinGW esposes a non-conforming
(v)snprintf behavior despite the tests against the MSVC runtime pass.
Therefore it has been included in the "non-conforming" scope alongide
older MSVC rungime environments.
2018-10-22 10:43:56 +02:00
Simon Butcher e1660af2e2 Fix CSR parsing header call
Change the secondary X509 CSR parsing call for the alternative MS header to only
occur if the first call fails due to the header being unfound, instead of any
call.
2018-10-07 17:48:37 +01:00
Simon Butcher 5199227d87 Add Changelog entry for #767
Add Changelog entry for fix for alternative header/footers in CSR's.
2018-10-06 17:19:31 +01:00
Simon Butcher 03de21059d Add additional test case for alternative CSR headers
Add a test case for alternative headers possible for CSR's, as defined in
RFC7468.
2018-10-06 17:19:31 +01:00
Simon Butcher 0488ce653a Add support for alternative CSR headers
Add support for RFC7468, and the alternative Microsoft footer/headers for CSR's
that contain the text 'BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST' instead of
'BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST'.
2018-10-06 17:17:54 +01:00
Hanno Becker a08651f484 Remove lines above 80 characters in library/ctr_drbg.c 2018-10-05 09:38:59 +01:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak 54187b8299 Improve wording in ChangeLog 2018-09-24 14:17:50 +02:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak 1555716994 Correct formatting in mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprint() doxygen comment 2018-09-24 14:15:46 +02:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak edb868dcf9 Move MinGW specific define out of a header file 2018-09-24 12:41:18 +02:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak 41734a1f2a Return an error code from a dummy function 2018-09-13 15:04:31 +02:00
Krzysztof Stachowiak 643bcb36f6 Force ANSI stdio in MinGW 2018-08-29 16:58:29 +02:00
k-stachowiak 723f8674c4 Provide cross platform vsnprintf wrapper 2018-07-16 14:27:07 +02:00
Ron Eldor fa8f635ead Add MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST check in header files
Add the `MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST` precompilation surrounding the self test functions,
which were missing this check in the header files. ( most of the header files were missing this check).
Addresses issue #971
2018-05-21 18:40:10 +03:00
169 changed files with 14884 additions and 1883 deletions

4
.gitmodules vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
[submodule "crypto"]
path = crypto
url = https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto
branch = development

View file

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ option(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS with the pkcs11-helper library.
option(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT "Build mbed TLS with zlib library." OFF)
option(ENABLE_PROGRAMS "Build mbed TLS programs." ON)
option(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE "Build and use libmbedcrypto from the crypto submodule." OFF)
option(UNSAFE_BUILD "Allow unsafe builds. These builds ARE NOT SECURE." OFF)
@ -167,8 +168,6 @@ else()
set(LIB_INSTALL_DIR lib)
endif()
include_directories(include/)
if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
find_package(ZLIB)
@ -179,6 +178,10 @@ endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
add_subdirectory(library)
add_subdirectory(include)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
add_subdirectory(crypto/library)
add_subdirectory(crypto/include)
endif()
if(ENABLE_PROGRAMS)
add_subdirectory(programs)

View file

@ -50,15 +50,15 @@ When backporting to these branches please observe the following rules:
2. All bug fixes that correct a defect that is also present in an LTS branch must be backported to that LTS branch. If a bug fix introduces a change to the API such as a new function, the fix should be reworked to avoid the API change. API changes without very strong justification are unlikely to be accepted.
3. If a contribution is a new feature or enhancement, no backporting is required. Exceptions to this may be addtional test cases or quality improvements such as changes to build or test scripts.
3. If a contribution is a new feature or enhancement, no backporting is required. Exceptions to this may be additional test cases or quality improvements such as changes to build or test scripts.
It would be highly appreciated if contributions are backported to LTS branches in addition to the [development branch](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development) by contributors.
Currently maintained LTS branches are:
1. [mbedtls-2.1](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.1)
1. [mbedtls-2.7](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.7)
2. [mbedtls-2.7](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.7)
1. [mbedtls-2.16](https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.16)
Tests

104
ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,5 +1,81 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 2.17.0 branch released 2019-03-19
Features
* Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`
which allows copy-less parsing of DER encoded X.509 CRTs,
at the cost of additional lifetime constraints on the input
buffer, but at the benefit of reduced RAM consumption.
* Add a new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring() to write ASN.1
named bitstring in DER as required by RFC 5280 Appendix B.
* Add MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing 3DES ciphersuites
from the default list (enabled by default). See
https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf.
API Changes
* Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`.
See the Features section for more information.
* Allow to opt in to the removal the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()
for the benefit of saving RAM, by disabling the new compile-time
option MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE (enabled by default for
API stability). Disabling this option makes mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()
always return NULL, and removes the peer_cert field from the
mbedtls_ssl_session structure which otherwise stores the peer's
certificate.
Bugfix
* Fix a compilation issue with mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx not being defined
when MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined. Reported by jwhui. Fixes #2242.
* Run the AD too long test only if MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT is not defined.
Raised as a comment in #1996.
* Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random() which could
previously lead to a stack overflow on constrained targets.
* Add `MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST` for the mbedtls_self_test functions
in the header files, which missed the precompilation check. #971
* Fix returning the value 1 when mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey failed.
* Remove a duplicate #include in a sample program. Fixed by Masashi Honma #2326.
* Remove the mbedtls namespacing from the header file, to fix a "file not found"
build error. Fixed by Haijun Gu #2319.
* Fix signed-to-unsigned integer conversion warning
in X.509 module. Fixes #2212.
* Reduce stack usage of `mpi_write_hlp()` by eliminating recursion.
Fixes #2190.
* Fix false failure in all.sh when backup files exist in include/mbedtls
(e.g. config.h.bak). Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin) #2407.
* Ensure that unused bits are zero when writing ASN.1 bitstrings when using
mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring().
* Fix issue when writing the named bitstrings in KeyUsage and NsCertType
extensions in CSRs and CRTs that caused these bitstrings to not be encoded
correctly as trailing zeroes were not accounted for as unused bits in the
leading content octet. Fixes #1610.
Changes
* Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing
the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice.
* Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration,
instead of relying on other header files that they include.
Inserted as an enhancement for #1371
* Add support for alternative CSR headers, as used by Microsoft and defined
in RFC 7468. Found by Michael Ernst. Fixes #767.
* Correct many misspellings. Fixed by MisterDA #2371.
* Provide an abstraction of vsnprintf to allow alternative implementations
for platforms that don't provide it. Based on contributions by Joris Aerts
and Nathaniel Wesley Filardo.
* Fix clobber list in MIPS assembly for large integer multiplication.
Previously, this could lead to functionally incorrect assembly being
produced by some optimizing compilers, showing up as failures in
e.g. RSA or ECC signature operations. Reported in #1722, fix suggested
by Aurelien Jarno and submitted by Jeffrey Martin.
* Reduce the complexity of the timing tests. They were assuming more than the
underlying OS actually guarantees.
* Fix configuration queries in ssl-opt.h. #2030
* Ensure that ssl-opt.h can be run in OS X. #2029
* Re-enable certain interoperability tests in ssl-opt.sh which had previously
been disabled for lack of a sufficiently recent version of GnuTLS on the CI.
* Ciphersuites based on 3DES now have the lowest priority by default when
they are enabled.
= mbed TLS 2.16.0 branch released 2018-12-21
Features
@ -57,6 +133,24 @@ Bugfix
* Clarify documentation of mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert() regarding the absence
of check for certificate/key matching. Reported by Attila Molnar, #507.
= mbed TLS 2.15.1 branch released 2018-11-30
Changes
* Update the Mbed Crypto submodule to version 0.1.0b2.
= mbed TLS 2.15.0 branch released 2018-11-23
Features
* Add an experimental build option, USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE, to enable use of
Mbed Crypto as the source of the cryptography implementation.
* Add an experimental configuration option, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, to enable
the PSA Crypto API from Mbed Crypto when additionally used with the
USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE build option.
Changes
* Add unit tests for AES-GCM when called through mbedtls_cipher_auth_xxx()
from the cipher abstraction layer. Fixes #2198.
= mbed TLS 2.14.1 branch released 2018-11-30
Security
@ -309,7 +403,7 @@ Security
1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to execute code on the local
machine as well as manipulate network packets, to partially recover the
plaintext of messages under some conditions by using a cache attack
targetting an internal MD/SHA buffer. With TLS or if
targeting an internal MD/SHA buffer. With TLS or if
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only worked if
the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly sent over
connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM or CCM
@ -1195,7 +1289,7 @@ Bugfix
* Fix potential build failures related to the 'apidoc' target, introduced
in the previous patch release. Found by Robert Scheck. #390 #391
* Fix issue in Makefile that prevented building using armar. #386
* Fix memory leak that occured only when ECJPAKE was enabled and ECDHE and
* Fix memory leak that occurred only when ECJPAKE was enabled and ECDHE and
ECDSA was disabled in config.h . The leak didn't occur by default.
* Fix an issue that caused valid certificates to be rejected whenever an
expired or not yet valid certificate was parsed before a valid certificate
@ -1437,7 +1531,7 @@ API Changes
You now need to link to all of them if you use TLS for example.
* All public identifiers moved to the mbedtls_* or MBEDTLS_* namespace.
Some names have been further changed to make them more consistent.
Migration helpers scripts/rename.pl and include/mbedlts/compat-1.3.h are
Migration helpers scripts/rename.pl and include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h are
provided. Full list of renamings in scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt
* Renamings of fields inside structures, not covered by the previous list:
mbedtls_cipher_info_t.key_length -> key_bitlen
@ -1492,7 +1586,7 @@ API Changes
* net_accept() gained new arguments for the size of the client_ip buffer.
* In the threading layer, mbedtls_mutex_init() and mbedtls_mutex_free() now
return void.
* ecdsa_write_signature() gained an addtional md_alg argument and
* ecdsa_write_signature() gained an additional md_alg argument and
ecdsa_write_signature_det() was deprecated.
* pk_sign() no longer accepts md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE with ECDSA.
* Last argument of x509_crt_check_key_usage() and
@ -3027,7 +3121,7 @@ XySSL ChangeLog
not swapped on PadLock; also fixed compilation on older versions
of gcc (bug reported by David Barrett)
* Correctly handle the case in padlock_xcryptcbc() when input or
ouput data is non-aligned by falling back to the software
output data is non-aligned by falling back to the software
implementation, as VIA Nehemiah cannot handle non-aligned buffers
* Fixed a memory leak in x509parse_crt() which was reported by Greg
Robson-Garth; some x509write.c fixes by Pascal Vizeli, thanks to

View file

@ -28,7 +28,13 @@ install: no_test
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/lib
cp -RP library/libmbedtls.* $(DESTDIR)/lib
cp -RP library/libmbedx509.* $(DESTDIR)/lib
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/include/psa
cp -rp crypto/include/psa $(DESTDIR)/include
cp -RP crypto/library/libmbedcrypto.* $(DESTDIR)/lib
else
cp -RP library/libmbedcrypto.* $(DESTDIR)/lib
endif
mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)/bin
for p in programs/*/* ; do \
@ -44,6 +50,9 @@ uninstall:
rm -f $(DESTDIR)/lib/libmbedtls.*
rm -f $(DESTDIR)/lib/libmbedx509.*
rm -f $(DESTDIR)/lib/libmbedcrypto.*
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
$(MAKE) -C crypto uninstall
endif
for p in programs/*/* ; do \
if [ -x $$p ] && [ ! -d $$p ] ; \
@ -85,6 +94,9 @@ clean:
$(MAKE) -C library clean
$(MAKE) -C programs clean
$(MAKE) -C tests clean
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
$(MAKE) -C crypto clean
endif
ifndef WINDOWS
find . \( -name \*.gcno -o -name \*.gcda -o -name \*.info \) -exec rm {} +
endif

View file

@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ In order to build for a Windows platform, you should use `WINDOWS_BUILD=1` if th
Setting the variable `SHARED` in your environment will build shared libraries in addition to the static libraries. Setting `DEBUG` gives you a debug build. You can override `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` by setting them in your environment or on the make command line; compiler warning options may be overridden separately using `WARNING_CFLAGS`. Some directory-specific options (for example, `-I` directives) are still preserved.
Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -W`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overriden from the command line.
Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -W`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overridden from the command line.
Depending on your platform, you might run into some issues. Please check the Makefiles in `library/`, `programs/` and `tests/` for options to manually add or remove for specific platforms. You can also check [the Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://tls.mbed.org/kb) for articles on your platform or issue.
@ -158,6 +158,43 @@ Configurations
We provide some non-standard configurations focused on specific use cases in the `configs/` directory. You can read more about those in `configs/README.txt`
Using Mbed Crypto as a submodule
--------------------------------
As an experimental feature, you can use Mbed Crypto as the source of the cryptography implementation, with Mbed TLS providing the X.509 and TLS parts of the library. Mbed Crypto is currently provided for evaluation only and should not be used in production. At this point, you should only use this option if you want to try out the experimental PSA Crypto API.
To enable the use of Mbed Crypto as a submodule:
1. Check out the `crypto` submodule and update it.
git submodule init crypto
git submodule update crypto
2. (Optional) TO enable the PSA Crypto API, set the build configuration option `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`. You can either edit `include/mbedtls/config.h` directly or use the configuration script:
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
3. Activate the build option `USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE`. With GNU make, set `USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1` on each make invocation:
make USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1
make USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1 test
tests/ssl-opt.sh -f Default
Note that you need to pass `USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1` even to `make clean`. For example, if you change `config.h`, run this before rebuilding:
make USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1 clean
With CMake, create a build directory (recommended) and pass `-DUSE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1` to `cmake`:
mkdir build
cd build
cmake -DUSE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE=1 ..
make
make test
tests/ssl-opt.sh -f Default
Note that this does not enable the PSA-specific tests and utility programs. To use these programs, use Mbed Crypto as a standalone project.
Porting Mbed TLS
----------------

1
crypto Submodule

@ -0,0 +1 @@
Subproject commit a78c958b17d75ddf63d8dd17255b6379dcbf259f

View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
*/
/**
* @mainpage mbed TLS v2.16.0 source code documentation
* @mainpage mbed TLS v2.17.0 source code documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in

View file

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ DOXYFILE_ENCODING = UTF-8
# identify the project. Note that if you do not use Doxywizard you need
# to put quotes around the project name if it contains spaces.
PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.16.0"
PROJECT_NAME = "mbed TLS v2.17.0"
# The PROJECT_NUMBER tag can be used to enter a project or revision number.
# This could be handy for archiving the generated documentation or

View file

@ -655,6 +655,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine.
*
@ -663,6 +665,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H
#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "aes.h"
#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u

View file

@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned
*/
int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "asn1.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \
@ -276,6 +282,28 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits );
/**
* \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag
* (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format.
*
* As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are
* omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER.
*
* \note This function works backwards within the data buffer.
*
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking.
* \param buf The bitstring to write.
* \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t bits );
/**
* \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
* and value in ASN.1 format.

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H
#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A /**< Output buffer too small. */
@ -75,6 +81,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *src, size_t slen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -82,6 +89,8 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
*/
int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -943,6 +943,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -950,6 +952,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H
#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "bignum.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
@ -750,7 +756,7 @@
"sw $10, %2 \n\t" \
: "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
: "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
: "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15" \
: "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \
);
#endif /* MIPS */

View file

@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
unsigned char *output );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -315,6 +317,8 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -49,6 +49,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "cipher.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /**< Bad input parameters to the function. */

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H
#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus

View file

@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
!defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT
#endif
#endif /* _WIN32 */
#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && \
@ -109,14 +114,15 @@
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \
( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative ECP implementation"
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
@ -274,6 +280,14 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) )
#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \
( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) )
#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -501,6 +515,38 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
#error "Only one of MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C can be defined"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) )
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C) && \
! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) )
#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
@ -643,6 +689,10 @@
#endif
#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
@ -691,7 +741,7 @@
/*
* Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this
* workaround since this is included by every single file before the
* #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in emtpy translation units.
* #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units;

View file

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD
@ -180,16 +180,16 @@ typedef enum {
/** Supported cipher modes. */
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */
MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */
} mbedtls_cipher_mode_t;
@ -322,14 +322,32 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t
/** CMAC-specific context. */
mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed
* by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation
* of the PSA Crypto API.
* This is unset if the cipher context was established through
* mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through
* mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa().
*/
unsigned char psa_enabled;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
} mbedtls_cipher_context_t;
/**
* \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported by the generic
* cipher module.
* \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported
* by the generic cipher module.
*
* \return A statically-allocated array of ciphers. The last entry
* is zero.
* For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can
* obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure
* via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used
* to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup().
*
*
* \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers
* of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero.
*/
const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void );
@ -396,9 +414,8 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
/**
* \brief This function initializes and fills the cipher-context
* structure with the appropriate values. It also clears
* the structure.
* \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
* use with the given cipher primitive.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. This must be initialized.
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
@ -416,6 +433,33 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
* PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive.
*
* \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL.
* \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
* \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the
* authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide
* the same tag length.
* For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* parameter-verification failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
* cipher-specific context fails.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
size_t taglen );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher.
*
@ -638,7 +682,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
* \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
* \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable
* buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes.
* \param ad_len the Length of \p ad Bytes.
* \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A specific error code on failure.
@ -681,8 +725,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
* unsupported mode for a cipher.
* \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen );
int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen, unsigned char *output,
size_t *olen );
/**
* \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still

View file

@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -114,6 +118,30 @@ typedef struct
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info;
} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
typedef enum
{
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0,
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */
/* use raw key material internally imported */
/* into a allocated key slot, and which */
/* hence need to destroy that key slot */
/* when they are no longer needed. */
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */
/* which use a key from a key slot */
/* provided by the user, and which */
/* hence should not be destroyed when */
/* the context is no longer needed. */
} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership;
typedef struct
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
psa_key_handle_t slot;
mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state;
} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[];
extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[];

View file

@ -28,6 +28,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H
#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus

View file

@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)

View file

@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
*
* System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below).
* The time needs to be correct (not necesarily very accurate, but at least
* The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least
* the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of
* X.509 certificates.
*
@ -226,6 +226,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT
@ -401,7 +402,7 @@
* \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are
* currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt,
* respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should
* be overriden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt
* be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt
* must stay untouched.
*
* \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set
@ -686,6 +687,26 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES
*
* Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS.
* This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as
* returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible
* to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including
* them explicitly.
*
* A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through
* a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical
* (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan
* Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls
* in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option
* enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites.
*
* Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
*
@ -1201,6 +1222,30 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
*
* When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure
* Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a
* NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process
* Environment).
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto.c
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
*
* Enable the non-volatile secure storage usage.
*
* This is crucial on systems that do not have a HW TRNG support.
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
*
@ -1329,6 +1374,28 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
*
* This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()
* giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake.
*
* Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is
* recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage.
*
* \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still
* defined, but always returns \c NULL.
*
* \note This option has no influence on the protection against the
* triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will
* still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation,
* for exaple by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate.
*
* Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate
* after the handshake.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL
*
@ -1538,7 +1605,7 @@
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
*
* Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL.
* Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintainance of a
* Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a
* session store remains the responsibility of the application, though).
* Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing
* tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example
@ -1624,6 +1691,24 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
*
* Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, see
* #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
*
* Note: this option is still in progress, the full X.509 and TLS modules are
* not covered yet, but parts that are not ported to PSA yet will still work
* as usual, so enabling this option should not break backwards compatibility.
*
* \warning Support for PSA is still an experimental feature.
* Any public API that depends on this option may change
* at any time until this warning is removed.
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
*
@ -1704,7 +1789,7 @@
*
* \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the
* CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if
* CRIME or similar exploits may be a applicable to your use case.
* CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case.
*
* \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS.
*
@ -2632,6 +2717,65 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
*
* Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* \note This option only has an effect when the build option
* USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE is also in use.
*
* \warning This feature is experimental and available on an opt-in basis only.
* PSA APIs are subject to change at any time. The implementation comes with
* less assurance and support than the rest of Mbed TLS.
*
* Module: crypto/library/psa_crypto.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
*
* Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and one of either
* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
* (but not both)
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
*
* Enable persistent key storage over files for the
* Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage_file.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_FS_IO
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
*
* Enable persistent key storage over PSA ITS for the
* Platform Security Architecture cryptography API.
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto_storage_its.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
*
@ -3016,7 +3160,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */
/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */
/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
@ -3033,8 +3177,9 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */
/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */
/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */

View file

@ -36,6 +36,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "aes.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -350,6 +356,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine.
*
@ -358,6 +366,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
/* Internal functions (do not call directly) */
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *,
int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *,

View file

@ -338,6 +338,8 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32],
const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -345,6 +347,8 @@ void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32],
*/
int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The DMH checkup routine.
*
@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path );
*/
int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H
#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ecp.h"
/*

View file

@ -32,28 +32,39 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ecp.h"
#include "md.h"
/*
* RFC-4492 page 20:
/**
* \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
*
* \param bits Curve size in bits
* \return Maximum signature size in bytes
*
* \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument
* is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times.
*/
/*
* Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
* r INTEGER,
* s INTEGER
* }
*
* Size is at most
* 1 (tag) + 1 (len) + 1 (initial 0) + ECP_MAX_BYTES for each of r and s,
* twice that + 1 (tag) + 2 (len) for the sequence
* (assuming ECP_MAX_BYTES is less than 126 for r and s,
* and less than 124 (total len <= 255) for the sequence)
* For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit.
*/
#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES > 124
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES bigger than expected, please fix MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN"
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \
( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \
/*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \
/*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) )
/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN ( 3 + 2 * ( 3 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) )
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS )
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {

View file

@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
* The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could
* also be use outside TLS.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ecp.h"
#include "md.h"

View file

@ -36,6 +36,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "bignum.h"
/*
@ -189,6 +195,68 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group
}
mbedtls_ecp_group;
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
* The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
* Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line.
* \{
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS)
/**
* The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< The maximum size of groups, in bits. */
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 )
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE)
/*
* Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication.
* Default: 6.
* Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7.
*
* Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) )
* points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC
* peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage
* by two (if large curves are in use).
*
* Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first.
* Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1):
* w-size: 6 5 4 3 2
* 521 145 141 135 120 97
* 384 214 209 198 177 146
* 256 320 320 303 262 226
* 224 475 475 453 398 342
* 192 640 640 633 587 476
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< The maximum window size used. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM)
/*
* Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication.
*
* This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the
* multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in
* ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4.
*
* The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2.
*
* Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */
/* \} name SECTION: Module settings */
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
#include "ecp_alt.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
@ -253,68 +321,6 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
* The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
* Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line.
* \{
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS)
/**
* The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< The maximum size of groups, in bits. */
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 )
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE)
/*
* Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication.
* Default: 6.
* Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7.
*
* Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) )
* points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC
* peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage
* by two (if large curves are in use).
*
* Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first.
* Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1):
* w-size: 6 5 4 3 2
* 521 145 141 135 120 97
* 384 214 209 198 177 146
* 256 320 320 303 262 226
* 224 475 475 453 398 342
* 192 640 640 633 587 476
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< The maximum window size used. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM)
/*
* Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication.
*
* This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the
* multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in
* ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4.
*
* The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2.
*
* Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */
/* \} name SECTION: Module settings */
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
#include "ecp_alt.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
/**
* \brief The ECP key-pair structure.
*

View file

@ -61,6 +61,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
/**

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H
#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
/**

View file

@ -33,6 +33,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H
#define MBEDTLS_GCM_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "cipher.h"
#include <stdint.h>
@ -300,6 +306,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
*/
void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The GCM checkup routine.
*
@ -308,6 +316,8 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx );
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H
#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024

View file

@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "md.h"
/**

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H
#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "md.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -76,7 +82,7 @@ extern "C" {
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context
{
/* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitely,
/* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly,
* but is implied by the HMAC context */
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */
unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */

View file

@ -283,6 +283,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -295,6 +297,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -300,6 +302,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -300,6 +302,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -23,6 +23,11 @@
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#include "net_sockets.h"

View file

@ -37,6 +37,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H
#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus

View file

@ -28,6 +28,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H
#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "aes.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H
#define MBEDTLS_PEM_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
/**

View file

@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
#include "ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@ -83,6 +87,7 @@ typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS,
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
} mbedtls_pk_type_t;
/**
@ -209,6 +214,11 @@ void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
*
* \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized.
* If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing.
*
* \note For contexts that have been set up with
* mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying
* key slot and you still need to call psa_destroy_key()
* independently if you want to destroy that key.
*/
void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
@ -247,6 +257,38 @@ void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx );
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key slot.
*
* \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts
* that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key slot instead of
* storing and manipulating the key material directly.
*
* \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE).
* \param key The PSA key slot to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair
* (see notes below).
*
* \note The wrapped key slot must remain valid as long as the
* wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between
* the point this function is called and the point
* mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped
* key slot might then be independently used or destroyed.
*
* \note This function is currently only available for ECC key
* pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material).
* Support for other key types may be added later.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input
* (context already used, invalid key slot).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an
* ECC key pair.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const psa_key_handle_t key );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/**
* \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context
@ -501,7 +543,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
* \param pub Context holding a public key.
* \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key.
*
* \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA
* \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not
* be checked - in that case they may or may not match.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid.
* \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv );
@ -740,6 +786,31 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Turn an EC key into an Opaque one
*
* \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might
* change or be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the
* specified hash is the only allowed use of that key.
*
* \param pk Input: the EC key to transfer to a PSA key slot.
* Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key slot.
* \param slot Output: the chosen slot for storing the key.
* It's the caller's responsibility to destroy that slot
* after calling mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context.
* \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_handle_t *slot,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -135,4 +135,8 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "md.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "asn1.h"

View file

@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "asn1.h"
#include "md.h"
@ -85,6 +91,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p
unsigned int iteration_count,
uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -92,6 +100,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *p
*/
int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -58,17 +58,33 @@ extern "C" {
* \{
*/
/* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming
* implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf
* and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds.
*/
#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF)
#if defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */
#endif
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */
#endif
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF)
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */
#endif
@ -204,7 +220,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) );
* - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when
* the destination buffer is too short.
*/
#if defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF)
/* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */
int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... );
#endif
@ -230,6 +246,41 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */
/*
* The function pointers for vsnprintf
*
* The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99:
* - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer
* (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched)
* - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when
* the destination buffer is too short.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF)
/* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */
int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT)
#include <stdarg.h>
extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg );
/**
* \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer
*
* \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation
*
* \return \c 0
*/
int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n,
const char * format, va_list arg ) );
#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO)
#define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO
#else
#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
/*
* The function pointers for exit
*/

View file

@ -26,14 +26,14 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#include "platform_time.h"
#include <time.h>
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */

View file

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif

482
include/mbedtls/psa_util.h Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
/**
* \file psa_util.h
*
* \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library.
*
* \warning This function is not part of the public API and may
* change at any time.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "ecp.h"
#include "md.h"
#include "pk.h"
#include "oid.h"
#include <string.h>
/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */
static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher )
{
switch( cipher )
{
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:
return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES );
/* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */
/* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:
return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen )
{
switch( mode )
{
case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) );
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) );
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
if( taglen == 0 )
return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING );
/* Intentional fallthrough for taglen != 0 */
/* fallthrough */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation(
mbedtls_operation_t op )
{
switch( op )
{
case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:
return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT );
case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:
return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT );
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
/* Translations for hashing. */
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
switch( md_alg )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2:
return( PSA_ALG_MD2 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4:
return( PSA_ALG_MD4 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
return( PSA_ALG_MD5 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 );
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 );
#endif
case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: /* Intentional fallthrough */
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
/* Translations for ECC. */
static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id(
psa_ecc_curve_t curve, char const **oid, size_t *oid_len )
{
switch( curve )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
case PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1:
*oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1;
*oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 );
return( 0 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
}
return( -1 );
}
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 )
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
static inline psa_ecc_curve_t mbedtls_psa_translate_ecc_group( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid )
{
switch( grpid )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
return( PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 );
#endif
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_KEY_BITS_OF_CURVE( curve ) \
( curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 ? 192 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 ? 224 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 ? 256 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 ? 384 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 ? 521 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 ? 192 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 ? 224 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 ? 256 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 ? 256 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 ? 384 : \
curve == PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 ? 512 : \
0 )
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_KEY_BYTES_OF_CURVE( curve ) \
( ( MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_KEY_BITS_OF_CURVE( curve ) + 7 ) / 8 )
/* Translations for PK layer */
static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status )
{
switch( status )
{
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return( 0 );
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* All other failures */
case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures',
* but list them separately nonetheless to indicate
* which failure conditions we have considered. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
}
/* Translations for ECC */
/* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from
* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
* into a PSA ECC group identifier. */
static inline psa_ecc_curve_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group(
uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id )
{
/* The PSA identifiers are currently aligned with those from
* the TLS Supported Groups registry, so no conversion is necessary. */
return( (psa_ecc_curve_t) tls_ecc_grp_reg_id );
}
/* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key
* exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts
* it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange
* message in an ECDHE exchange.
*
* Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys
* used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key
* as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead
* of making a copy.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( unsigned char *src,
size_t srclen,
unsigned char **dst,
size_t *dstlen )
{
*dst = src;
*dstlen = srclen;
return( 0 );
}
/* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure
* (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE
* exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key
* agreement API understands.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( psa_ecc_curve_t curve,
unsigned char const *src,
size_t srclen,
unsigned char *dst,
size_t dstlen,
size_t *olen )
{
((void) curve);
if( srclen > dstlen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
memcpy( dst, src, srclen );
*olen = srclen;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */

View file

@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -226,6 +228,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -150,13 +150,13 @@ mbedtls_rsa_context;
* \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key
* operations, since there might be security concerns in
* mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is
* a default value, which can be overriden by calling specific
* a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific
* \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions.
*
* \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP
* encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for
* making signatures, but can be overriden for verifying them.
* If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overriden.
* making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them.
* If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either
@ -601,7 +601,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
* \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
* `ilen == 0`.
* \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
* of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
* for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
@ -641,7 +642,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated).
* \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
* \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
* `ilen == 0`.
* \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
* of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
* for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
@ -685,7 +687,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes.
* \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes.
* \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
* buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
* `ilen == 0`.
* \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
* of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
* for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
@ -1252,6 +1255,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src )
*/
void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The RSA checkup routine.
*
@ -1260,6 +1265,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx );
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine.
*
@ -341,6 +343,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine.
*
@ -286,6 +288,8 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input,
*/
int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input,
#else
#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif
/**
* \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384
* checksum of a buffer.
@ -280,6 +281,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input,
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine.
*
@ -287,6 +291,7 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input,
* \return \c 1 on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}

View file

@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
#include "platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* SSL Error codes
*/
@ -783,6 +787,25 @@ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20
#else
/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */
#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT."
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* This structure is used for storing current session data.
*/
@ -798,7 +821,15 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_session
unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT
* changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */
unsigned char *peer_cert_digest;
size_t peer_cert_digest_len;
mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */
@ -923,19 +954,37 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char *psk; /*!< pre-shared key. This field should
only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
size_t psk_len; /*!< length of the pre-shared key. This
field should only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< identity for PSK negotiation. This
field should only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< length of identity. This field should
only be set via
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_handle_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If either no PSK or a raw PSK have
* been configured, this has value \c 0. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should
* only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* If either no PSK or an opaque PSK
* have been configured, this has value NULL. */
size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL. */
unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* This is set if and only if either
* \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */
size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque
* is not \c 0. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */
@ -2033,7 +2082,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one
* RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate
* certificate will be selected according to the client's
* advertised capabilities. In case mutliple certificates are
* advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are
* adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first
* call to this function, then second, etc.
*
@ -2065,68 +2114,146 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) and the expected identity name
* \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \note Currently clients can only register one pre-shared key.
* In other words, the servers' identity hint is ignored.
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more
* than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature but
* feedback is welcomed.
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key
* \param psk_len pre-shared key length
* \param psk_identity pointer to the pre-shared key identity
* \param psk_identity_len identity key length
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
* \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and
* hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime
* of the SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
* to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
* Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than
* once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
* Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
* one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
* but feedback is welcomed.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
* called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a
* key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy
* allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied
* in the handshake.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need
* not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the
* SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
psa_key_handle_t psk,
const unsigned char *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief Set the Pre Shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake
* \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* ie the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param psk pointer to the pre-shared key
* \param psk_len pre-shared key length
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot
* must be populated with a key of type
* PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its
* use for the key derivation algorithm
* applied in the handshake.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
psa_key_handle_t psk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only).
*
* If set, the PSK callback is called for each
* handshake where a PSK ciphersuite was negotiated.
* handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated.
* The caller provides the identity received and wants to
* receive the actual PSK data and length.
*
* The callback has the following parameters: (void *parameter,
* mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *psk_identity,
* size_t identity_len)
* The callback has the following parameters:
* - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk.
* - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
* the operation applies.
* - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity
* selected by the client.
* - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity
* selected by the client.
*
* If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() on the ssl context to set the
* correct PSK and return 0.
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()
* on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0.
* Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity.
*
* \note If you set a PSK callback using this function, then you
* don't need to set a PSK key and identity using
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_psk PSK identity function
* \param p_psk PSK identity parameter
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based
* in the PSK identity chosen by the client.
* \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to
* the callback, for example a PSK store.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
@ -2872,18 +2999,34 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection
* \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection.
*
* Note: Can be NULL in case no certificate was sent during
* the handshake. Different calls for the same connection can
* return the same or different pointers for the same
* certificate and even a different certificate altogether.
* The peer cert CAN change in a single connection if
* renegotiation is performed.
* \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \return The current peer certificate, if available.
* The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and
* is valid only until the next call to the SSL API.
* \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might
* be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs
* (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled,
* allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory.
*
* \return the current peer certificate
* \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during
* the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification
* callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling
* this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at
* the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification
* process, for example by masking expected and tolerated
* verification failures.
*
* \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function
* after any further call to the SSL API, including
* mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is
* because the pointer might change during renegotiation,
* which happens transparently to the user.
* If you want to use the certificate across API calls,
* you must make a copy.
*/
const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
@ -3200,7 +3343,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free().
*
* \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you
* manually set all of the relevent fields yourself.
* manually set all of the relevant fields yourself.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
*/

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ssl.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -64,7 +70,8 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry
mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "pk.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "md.h"
@ -480,6 +486,24 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ci
}
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
{
switch( info->key_exchange )
{
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
return( 1 );
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
{

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ssl.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)

View file

@ -24,9 +24,19 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include "ssl.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
#include "md5.h"
#endif
@ -47,6 +57,11 @@
#include "ecjpake.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_util.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@ -270,7 +285,15 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_ecc_curve_t ecdh_psa_curve;
psa_key_handle_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
@ -283,9 +306,12 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_handle_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
@ -305,8 +331,13 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
} ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
@ -367,11 +398,19 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
#else
mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
#else
mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
#endif
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
@ -732,6 +771,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
/* constant-time buffer comparison */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
{
@ -762,6 +804,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,

View file

@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
/*
* This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key
* management, rotating the keys periodically in order to preserve forward
@ -111,14 +117,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
/**
* \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback
*
* \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_write_t for description
* \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description
*/
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write;
/**
* \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback
*
* \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description
* \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description
*/
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse;

View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
* Major, Minor, Patchlevel
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 16
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 17
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0
/**
@ -47,9 +47,9 @@
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02100000
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.16.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.16.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02110000
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.17.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.17.0"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)

View file

@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of file failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 /**< Destination buffer is too small. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
/* \} name */
/**
@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *se
*
* \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
* \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occured,
* \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to );
@ -264,11 +264,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to );
*
* \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
* \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occured,
* \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -276,6 +278,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from );
*/
int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
/*
* Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you
* know you do.

View file

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
/**
* \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
*
* \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
* \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, s
/**
* \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
*
* \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
* \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding)

View file

@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ extern "C" {
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
{
int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
* by the structure or not. */
mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
@ -68,6 +70,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt
mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */
mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw;
mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
@ -220,16 +223,58 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
/**
* \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
* to the chained list.
* to the end of the provided chained list.
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param buf buffer holding the certificate DER data
* \param buflen size of the buffer
* \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
* When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
* to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
* mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
* \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
* \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
* \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer
* \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
* after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT
* buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints),
* use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/**
* \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
* to the end of the provided chained list. This is a
* variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes
* temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT
* is destroyed.
*
* \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
* When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
* to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
* mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
* \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded
* certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be
* retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the
* CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed
* through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free().
* \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
*
* \note This call is functionally equivalent to
* mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a
* copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime
* constraints. This is useful in constrained environments
* where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/**
* \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded

View file

@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_ty
* \param key_usage key usage flags to set
*
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
*
* \note The <code>decipherOnly</code> flag from the Key Usage
* extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e.
* <code>0x8000</code>), which cannot typically be represented
* in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag
* <code>decipherOnly</code> (i.e.
* #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this
* function.
*/
int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage );

View file

@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx,
unsigned char *output);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
/**
* \brief Checkup routine
*
@ -128,6 +130,8 @@ int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx,
*/
int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -146,42 +146,80 @@ elseif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
endif()
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${libs})
if(NOT USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${libs})
target_include_directories(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/)
endif()
add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target})
target_include_directories(${mbedx509_static_target}
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/)
add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target})
target_include_directories(${mbedtls_static_target}
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/
)
install(TARGETS ${mbedtls_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
install(TARGETS ${mbedtls_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
else()
install(TARGETS ${mbedtls_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
endif()
endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.0 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
if(NOT USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.17.0 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
target_include_directories(mbedcrypto PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/)
endif()
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.0 SOVERSION 0)
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.17.0 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
target_include_directories(mbedx509
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.16.0 SOVERSION 12)
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.17.0 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
target_include_directories(mbedtls
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/include/
PUBLIC ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/crypto/include/)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
else()
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto
DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR}
PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE)
endif()
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_custom_target(lib DEPENDS mbedcrypto mbedx509 mbedtls)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(lib mbedcrypto_static mbedx509_static mbedtls_static)
if(USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE)
add_custom_target(lib DEPENDS mbedx509 mbedtls)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(lib mbedx509_static mbedtls_static)
endif()
else()
add_custom_target(lib DEPENDS mbedcrypto mbedx509 mbedtls)
if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_dependencies(lib mbedcrypto_static mbedx509_static mbedtls_static)
endif()
endif()

View file

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ SOEXT_TLS=so.12
SOEXT_X509=so.0
SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.3
# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implentation that does not accept
# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept
# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar)
AR_DASH ?= -
@ -63,6 +63,13 @@ DLEXT = dylib
endif
endif
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
# Look in crypto for libmbedcrypto.
LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -L../crypto/library
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -I../crypto/include
CRYPTO := ../crypto/library/
else
OBJS_CRYPTO= aes.o aesni.o arc4.o \
aria.o asn1parse.o asn1write.o \
base64.o bignum.o blowfish.o \
@ -85,6 +92,8 @@ OBJS_CRYPTO= aes.o aesni.o arc4.o \
sha1.o sha256.o sha512.o \
threading.o timing.o version.o \
version_features.o xtea.o
CRYPTO :=
endif
OBJS_X509= certs.o pkcs11.o x509.o \
x509_create.o x509_crl.o x509_crt.o \
@ -148,7 +157,7 @@ ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
endif
endif
libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so
libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) $(CRYPTO)libmbedcrypto.so
echo " LD $@"
$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS_X509)
@ -165,6 +174,10 @@ libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll
$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
# crypto
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
libmbedcrypto.%:
$(MAKE) CRYPTO_INCLUDES:="-I../../include -I../include" -C ../crypto/library $@
else
libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
echo " AR $@"
$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
@ -190,6 +203,7 @@ libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
echo " LD $@"
$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
endif
.c.o:
echo " CC $<"

View file

@ -290,26 +290,75 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t bits )
{
size_t unused_bits, byte_len;
const unsigned char *cur_byte;
unsigned char cur_byte_shifted;
unsigned char bit;
byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8;
unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits;
/*
* Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding
* of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits
* when encoding this value in the first content octet
*/
if( bits != 0 )
{
cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1;
cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits;
for( ; ; )
{
bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1;
cur_byte_shifted >>= 1;
if( bit != 0 )
break;
bits--;
if( bits == 0 )
break;
if( bits % 8 == 0 )
cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte;
}
}
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( p, start, buf, bits ) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0, size;
size_t len = 0;
size_t unused_bits, byte_len;
size = ( bits / 8 ) + ( ( bits % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8;
unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits;
// Calculate byte length
//
if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size + 1 )
if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < byte_len + 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
len = size + 1;
(*p) -= size;
memcpy( *p, buf, size );
len = byte_len + 1;
// Write unused bits
//
*--(*p) = (unsigned char) (size * 8 - bits);
/* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */
if( byte_len > 0 )
{
byte_len--;
*--( *p ) = buf[byte_len] & ~( ( 0x1 << unused_bits ) - 1 );
( *p ) -= byte_len;
memcpy( *p, buf, byte_len );
}
/* Write unused bits */
*--( *p ) = (unsigned char)unused_bits;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) );

View file

@ -527,26 +527,38 @@ cleanup:
}
/*
* Helper to write the digits high-order first
* Helper to write the digits high-order first.
*/
static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, char **p )
static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
char **p, const size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
size_t length = 0;
char *p_end = *p + buflen;
if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
do
{
if( length >= buflen )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) );
/*
* Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character.
*/
if( r < 0xA )
*(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r );
else
*(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( X, radix, p ) );
length++;
} while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 );
if( r < 10 )
*(*p)++ = (char)( r + 0x30 );
else
*(*p)++ = (char)( r + 0x37 );
memmove( *p, p_end, length );
*p += length;
cleanup:
@ -619,7 +631,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
if( T.s == -1 )
T.s = 1;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) );
}
*p++ = '\0';
@ -715,14 +727,101 @@ cleanup:
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint
* into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */
static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x )
{
uint8_t i;
mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0;
/* This works regardless of the endianness. */
for( i = 0; i < ciL; i++, x >>= 8 )
tmp |= ( x & 0xFF ) << ( ( ciL - 1 - i ) << 3 );
return( tmp );
}
static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x )
{
#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */
#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ )
return( x );
#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */
#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ )
/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */
#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ)
#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3)
#define have_bswap
#endif
#endif
#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin)
#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \
__has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64)
#define have_bswap
#endif
#endif
#if defined(have_bswap)
/* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */
switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) )
{
case 4:
return( __builtin_bswap32(x) );
case 8:
return( __builtin_bswap64(x) );
}
#endif
#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */
#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */
/* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order
* or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */
return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) );
}
static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs )
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left;
mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right;
if( limbs == 0 )
return;
/*
* Traverse limbs and
* - adapt byte-order in each limb
* - swap the limbs themselves.
* For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right
* and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger
* than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the
* indices coincide in the last iteration).
*/
for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 );
cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right;
cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- )
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
/* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right,
* this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */
tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left );
*cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right );
*cur_limb_right = tmp;
}
}
/*
* Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
size_t i, j;
size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen;
unsigned char *Xp;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL );
@ -734,11 +833,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bu
mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ )
X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3);
/* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source argument,
* even if buflen is 0. */
if( buf != NULL )
{
Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p;
memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen );
mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs );
}
cleanup:
@ -2008,18 +2113,28 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size );
size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - size;
unsigned char *Xp;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
if( size > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
if( X->n != limbs )
{
mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, buf, size ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, buf, size ) );
Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p;
f_rng( p_rng, Xp + overhead, size );
mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs );
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
return( ret );
}

View file

@ -58,6 +58,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -76,7 +81,8 @@
* a non-zero value.
* This is currently only used by GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
*/
static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2, size_t len )
static int mbedtls_constant_time_memcmp( const void *v1, const void *v2,
size_t len )
{
const unsigned char *p1 = (const unsigned char*) v1;
const unsigned char *p2 = (const unsigned char*) v2;
@ -113,7 +119,8 @@ const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void )
return( mbedtls_cipher_supported );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(
const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -124,7 +131,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher
return( NULL );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(
const char *cipher_name )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -138,9 +146,10 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher
return( NULL );
}
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode )
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(
const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
int key_bitlen,
const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
@ -164,6 +173,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL )
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED )
{
/* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */
(void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot );
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) );
mbedtls_free( cipher_psa );
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) );
return;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( ctx->cmac_ctx )
{
@ -179,7 +211,8 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) );
}
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
{
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
@ -206,6 +239,38 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_in
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
size_t taglen )
{
psa_algorithm_t alg;
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa;
if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are
* supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */
alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen );
if( alg == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) );
cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) );
if( cipher_psa == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED );
cipher_psa->alg = alg;
ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa;
ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
ctx->psa_enabled = 1;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
int key_bitlen,
@ -218,6 +283,72 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_usage_t key_usage;
psa_key_policy_t key_policy;
/* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */
if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */
if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
ctx->cipher_info->type );
if( key_type == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
/* Allocate a key slot to use. */
status = psa_allocate_key( &cipher_psa->slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to
* destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */
cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED;
/* From that point on, the responsibility for destroying the
* key slot is on mbedtls_cipher_free(). This includes the case
* where the policy setup or key import below fail, as
* mbedtls_cipher_free() needs to be called in any case. */
/* Setup policy for the new key slot. */
key_policy = psa_key_policy_init();
/* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation
* (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption
* and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this
* are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */
/* key_usage = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */
key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &key_policy, key_usage, cipher_psa->alg );
status = psa_set_key_policy( cipher_psa->slot, &key_policy );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Populate new key slot. */
status = psa_import_key( cipher_psa->slot,
key_type, key, key_bytelen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen;
ctx->operation = operation;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 &&
(int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen )
{
@ -256,6 +387,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */
if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH )
@ -299,6 +439,15 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx )
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* We don't support resetting PSA-based
* cipher contexts, yet. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
return( 0 );
@ -313,6 +462,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
@ -359,6 +518,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *i
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
*olen = 0;
block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx );
@ -768,6 +937,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
*olen = 0;
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode ||
@ -860,6 +1039,19 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding
* schemes, we currently don't make them
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
switch( mode )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
@ -911,6 +1103,18 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
@ -924,8 +1128,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if ( tag_len != 16U )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx,
tag ) );
return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
(mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) );
}
#endif
@ -948,14 +1152,25 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
* operations, we currently don't make it
* accessible through the cipher layer. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag, tag_len ) ) )
if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(
(mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag, tag_len ) ) )
{
return( ret );
}
@ -975,8 +1190,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx,
check_tag );
ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
(mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag );
if ( ret != 0 )
{
return( ret );
@ -1011,16 +1226,76 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
size_t part_len;
if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT )
{
status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op,
cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg );
}
else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT )
{
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op,
cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg );
}
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* In the following, we can immediately return on an error,
* because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations
* are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(),
* and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op,
input, ilen,
output, ilen, olen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op,
output + *olen, ilen - *olen,
&part_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
*olen += part_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, output, olen ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen,
output, olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, &finish_olen ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen,
&finish_olen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*olen += finish_olen;
@ -1047,13 +1322,45 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
* at the end of the encrypted message. */
if( tag != output + ilen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg,
iv, iv_len,
ad, ad_len,
input, ilen,
output, ilen + tag_len, olen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
*olen -= tag_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
*olen = ilen;
return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen,
iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output,
tag_len, tag ) );
return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
input, output, tag_len, tag ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
@ -1102,6 +1409,39 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 )
{
/* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
* a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
* still be in its default state of 0, which is
* guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
* below will gracefully fail. */
mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
* at the end of the encrypted message. */
if( tag != input + ilen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot,
cipher_psa->alg,
iv, iv_len,
ad, ad_len,
input, ilen + tag_len,
output, ilen, olen );
if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED );
else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{

View file

@ -2266,7 +2266,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] =
{ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL }
};
#define NUM_CIPHERS sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions / sizeof mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]
#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \
sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) )
int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */

View file

@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(
/*
* Initialize with an empty key
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
@ -120,8 +121,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *custom,
size_t len )
{
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN ) );
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy,
custom, len,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN ) );
}
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
@ -136,17 +138,20 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) );
}
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance )
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
int resistance )
{
ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
}
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len )
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
size_t len )
{
ctx->entropy_len = len;
}
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int interval )
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
int interval )
{
ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
}
@ -154,7 +159,8 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, int in
static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
{
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16];
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16];
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
@ -168,7 +174,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 );
memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 );
mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx );
/*
@ -193,7 +200,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ )
key[i] = i;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
@ -215,7 +223,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ?
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, chain, chain ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
chain, chain ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
@ -232,7 +241,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
/*
* Do final encryption with reduced data
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
@ -241,7 +251,8 @@ static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output,
for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
iv, iv ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
@ -277,7 +288,7 @@ exit:
* ctx->counter = V
*/
static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] )
const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] )
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char *p = tmp;
@ -298,8 +309,11 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
/*
* Crypt counter block
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
}
@ -310,9 +324,13 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
/*
* Update key and counter
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
}
memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
@ -496,11 +514,14 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
/*
* Crypt counter block
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 )
{
goto exit;
}
use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE :
output_len;
use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE )
? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len;
/*
* Copy random block to destination
*/
@ -520,7 +541,8 @@ exit:
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output,
size_t output_len )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
@ -541,7 +563,8 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_l
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const char *path )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
FILE *f;
@ -550,13 +573,19 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char
if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) !=
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
}
else
{
ret = 0;
}
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -565,7 +594,8 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const char *path )
{
int ret = 0;
FILE *f = NULL;
@ -679,7 +709,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
test_offset = 0;
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
(void *) entropy_source_pr, nonce_pers_pr, 16, 32 ) );
(void *) entropy_source_pr, nonce_pers_pr, 16, 32 ) );
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON );
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) );
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) );
@ -700,7 +730,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
test_offset = 0;
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len( &ctx, ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
(void *) entropy_source_nopr, nonce_pers_nopr, 16, 32 ) );
(void *) entropy_source_nopr, nonce_pers_nopr, 16, 32 ) );
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) );
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, 16 ) );

View file

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_time_t time_t
#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf
#endif
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
@ -90,20 +91,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
return;
va_start( argp, format );
#if defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
ret = _vsnprintf_s( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, _TRUNCATE, format, argp );
#else
ret = _vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp );
if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == DEBUG_BUF_SIZE )
{
str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE-1] = '\0';
ret = -1;
}
#endif
#else
ret = vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp );
#endif
ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp );
va_end( argp );
if( ret >= 0 && ret < DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 )

View file

@ -800,11 +800,16 @@ cleanup:
int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = 0;
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ) ||
mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
&ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */

View file

@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = {
0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51
};
/* Load my private keys and generate the correponding public keys */
/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */
static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1,
const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 )

View file

@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
// END generated code

View file

@ -41,6 +41,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
@ -147,6 +151,38 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info )
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Initialise a PSA-wrapping context
*/
int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const psa_key_handle_t key )
{
const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info;
psa_key_handle_t *pk_ctx;
psa_key_type_t type;
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_information( key, &type, NULL ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEYPAIR( type ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ;
if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
ctx->pk_info = info;
pk_ctx = (psa_key_handle_t *) ctx->pk_ctx;
*pk_ctx = key;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
/*
* Initialize an RSA-alt context
@ -472,12 +508,14 @@ int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_conte
PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL );
if( pub->pk_info == NULL ||
prv->pk_info == NULL ||
prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
prv->pk_info == NULL )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT )
{
if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA )
@ -543,4 +581,66 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx )
return( ctx->pk_info->type );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Load the key to a PSA key slot,
* then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot.
*
* Currently only works for EC private keys.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_handle_t *slot,
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
#else
psa_key_handle_t key;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec;
unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t d_len;
psa_ecc_curve_t curve_id;
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
int ret;
/* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk );
d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
curve_id = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( ec->grp.id )->tls_id;
key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR(
mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group ( curve_id ) );
/* allocate a key slot */
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_allocate_key( &key ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* set policy */
policy = psa_key_policy_init();
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN,
PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) );
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_set_key_policy( key, &policy ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* import private key in slot */
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( key, key_type, d, d_len ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* remember slot number to be destroyed later by caller */
*slot = key;
/* make PK context wrap the key slot */
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, key ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */

View file

@ -41,10 +41,20 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -472,6 +482,156 @@ static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
* those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *to, size_t to_len )
{
int ret;
size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 )
{
( *from )++;
unpadded_len--;
}
if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
memset( to, 0x00, padding_len );
memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len );
( *from ) += unpadded_len;
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
* to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
* twice as big as int_size.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size )
{
int ret;
size_t tmp_size;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Extract r */
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Extract s */
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
int ret;
psa_key_handle_t key_slot;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
psa_key_type_t psa_type;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
/* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */
unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
unsigned char *p;
mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md, psa_md;
psa_ecc_curve_t curve = mbedtls_psa_translate_ecc_group(
( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx )->grp.id );
const size_t signature_part_size = ( ( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx )->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8;
if( curve == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &pk_info;
key.pk_ctx = ctx;
p = buf + sizeof( buf );
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key );
if( key_len <= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
psa_md = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg );
if( psa_md == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( psa_md );
psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve );
if( ( ret = psa_allocate_key( &key_slot ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( ret ) );
policy = psa_key_policy_init();
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY, psa_sig_md );
if( ( ret = psa_set_key_policy( key_slot, &policy ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( ret );
goto cleanup;
}
if( psa_import_key( key_slot, psa_type, buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
/* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
* reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
p = (unsigned char*) sig;
if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf,
signature_part_size ) ) != 0 )
{
goto cleanup;
}
if( psa_asymmetric_verify( key_slot, psa_sig_md,
hash, hash_len,
buf, 2 * signature_part_size )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if( p != sig + sig_len )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
@ -487,6 +647,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@ -716,4 +877,182 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_handle_t ) );
/* no _init() function to call, an calloc() already zeroized */
return( ctx );
}
static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_handle_t ) );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx )
{
const psa_key_handle_t *key = (const psa_key_handle_t *) ctx;
size_t bits;
if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_information( *key, NULL, &bits ) )
return( 0 );
return( bits );
}
static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type )
{
/* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs,
* as checked by setup_psa().
* Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */
return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA );
}
/*
* Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
* to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
* See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
*
* p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
* start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
* n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
*/
static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
size_t n_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
len = n_len;
*p -= len;
memmove( *p, start, len );
/* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
* Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
* that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 )
{
++(*p);
--len;
}
/* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
if( len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
* Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
if( **p & 0x80 )
{
if( *p - start < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL );
*--(*p) = 0x00;
len += 1;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) );
return( (int) len );
}
/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
* See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
* MPIs, and in-place.
*
* [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
* [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
* [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
*/
static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
size_t buf_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
memmove( sig, p, len );
*sig_len = len;
return( 0 );
}
static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
const psa_key_handle_t *key = (const psa_key_handle_t *) ctx;
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) );
size_t bits, buf_len;
psa_status_t status;
/* PSA has its own RNG */
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
/* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide
* that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a
* maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is
* buggy anyway). */
status = psa_get_key_information( *key, NULL, &bits );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits );
/* make the signature */
status = psa_asymmetric_sign( *key, alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, buf_len, sig_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) );
/* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */
return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) );
}
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = {
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
"Opaque",
pk_opaque_get_bitlen,
pk_opaque_can_do,
NULL, /* verify - will be done later */
pk_opaque_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */
NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */
#endif
NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */
NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */
NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */
pk_opaque_alloc_wrap,
pk_opaque_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */
NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */
#endif
NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */

View file

@ -47,6 +47,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -173,6 +177,29 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
{
size_t buffer_size;
psa_key_handle_t* key_slot = (psa_key_handle_t*) key->pk_ctx;
if ( *p < start )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start );
if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_slot, start, buffer_size, &len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
else
{
*p -= len;
memmove( *p, start, len );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return( (int) len );
@ -183,6 +210,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si
int ret;
unsigned char *c;
size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
const char *oid;
PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
@ -208,18 +236,51 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, si
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ),
&oid, &oid_len ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( key );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY )
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_type_t key_type;
psa_key_handle_t handle;
psa_ecc_curve_t curve;
handle = *((psa_key_handle_t*) key->pk_ctx );
status = psa_get_key_information( handle, &key_type,
NULL /* bitsize not needed */ );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE( key_type );
if( curve == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( curve, &oid, &oid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
/* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin
* to pk_write_ec_param() above. */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, buf,
oid, oid_len ) );
/* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */
pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( pk_type, &oid,
&oid_len ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, oid, oid_len,
par_len ) );

View file

@ -82,28 +82,15 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ),
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */
#if defined(_WIN32)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF)
#include <stdarg.h>
int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... )
{
int ret;
va_list argp;
/* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */
if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL )
return( -1 );
va_start( argp, fmt );
#if defined(_TRUNCATE) && !defined(__MINGW32__)
ret = _vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, argp );
#else
ret = _vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp );
if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n )
{
s[n-1] = '\0';
ret = -1;
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp );
va_end( argp );
return( ret );
@ -140,6 +127,62 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF)
#include <stdarg.h>
int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg )
{
int ret;
/* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */
if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL )
return( -1 );
#if defined(_TRUNCATE)
ret = vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg );
#else
ret = vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, arg );
if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n )
{
s[n-1] = '\0';
ret = -1;
}
#endif
return( ret );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF)
/*
* Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences
*/
static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n,
const char * format, va_list arg )
{
((void) s);
((void) n);
((void) format);
((void) arg);
return( -1 );
}
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */
int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n,
const char * format,
va_list arg ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF;
int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n,
const char * format,
va_list arg ) )
{
mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF)
/*

View file

@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 )
@ -1171,7 +1171,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
p += hlen;
p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
*p++ = 1;
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
if( ilen != 0 )
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 )
@ -1218,7 +1219,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1263,7 +1264,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
}
*p++ = 0;
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
if( ilen != 0 )
memcpy( p, input, ilen );
return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
@ -1285,7 +1287,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ||
mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
switch( ctx->padding )
{
@ -1441,7 +1443,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
}
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
if( *olen != 0 )
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
ret = 0;
cleanup:
@ -1693,9 +1696,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
plaintext_max_size,
plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros
* into the output buffer. */
memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
* buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
* and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
* behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
* user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
* length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
* secrets. */
if( output_max_len != 0 )
memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
/* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
* of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen

View file

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -92,16 +93,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
entry->session.id_len ) != 0 )
continue;
memcpy( session->master, entry->session.master, 48 );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( session, &entry->session );
if( ret != 0 )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
session->verify_result = entry->session.verify_result;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/*
* Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain)
*/
if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL )
{
/* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to
* mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries
* have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */
if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1,
sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL )
{
@ -119,7 +128,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
ret = 0;
goto exit;
@ -239,9 +248,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
#endif
}
memcpy( &cur->session, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/*
* If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first
*/
@ -250,26 +258,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p );
memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Store peer certificate
*/
if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
/* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the
* X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT.
* This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand
* parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert`
* field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( &cur->session, session );
if( ret != 0 )
{
cur->peer_cert.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert->raw.len );
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */
if( cur->session.peer_cert != NULL )
{
cur->peer_cert.p =
mbedtls_calloc( 1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len );
if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL )
{
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, session->peer_cert->raw.p,
session->peer_cert->raw.len );
memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p,
cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p,
cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len );
cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len;
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->session.peer_cert );
mbedtls_free( cur->session.peer_cert );
cur->session.peer_cert = NULL;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
ret = 0;
@ -311,9 +336,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache )
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
mbedtls_free( prv );
}

View file

@ -43,11 +43,11 @@
/*
* Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security.
*
* Current rule (except rc4, weak and null which come last):
* Current rule (except RC4 and 3DES, weak and null which come last):
* 1. By key exchange:
* Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK
* 2. By key length and cipher:
* ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 > 3DES
* ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128
* 3. By cipher mode when relevant GCM > CCM > CBC > CCM_8
* 4. By hash function used when relevant
* 5. By key exchange/auth again: EC > non-EC
@ -126,11 +126,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
/* All remaining >= 128-bit ephemeral suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
/* The PSK ephemeral suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
@ -162,9 +157,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
/* The ECJPAKE suite */
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
@ -228,11 +220,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
/* All remaining >= 128-bit suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
/* The RSA PSK suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
@ -251,8 +238,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
/* The PSK suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
@ -275,6 +260,16 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
/* 3DES suites */
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
/* RC4 suites */
@ -2187,6 +2182,26 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void )
static int supported_ciphersuites[MAX_CIPHERSUITES];
static int supported_init = 0;
static int ciphersuite_is_removed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info )
{
(void)cs_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES)
if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES)
if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ||
cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */
return( 0 );
}
const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void )
{
/*
@ -2202,14 +2217,12 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void )
*p != 0 && q < supported_ciphersuites + MAX_CIPHERSUITES - 1;
p++ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES)
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info;
if( ( cs_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) ) != NULL &&
cs_info->cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
#else
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) != NULL )
#endif
!ciphersuite_is_removed( cs_info ) )
{
*(q++) = *p;
}
}
*q = 0;

View file

@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
@ -51,6 +55,44 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
@ -754,6 +796,15 @@ static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_inf
return( 1 );
#endif
/* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
@ -2062,6 +2113,64 @@ static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
uint16_t tls_id;
uint8_t ecpoint_len;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/*
* Parse ECC group
*/
if( end - *p < 4 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
/* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */
if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
/* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */
tls_id = *(*p)++;
tls_id <<= 8;
tls_id |= *(*p)++;
/* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_curve =
mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id ) ) == 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA.
*/
ecpoint_len = *(*p)++;
if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( handshake->ecdh_psa_curve,
*p, ecpoint_len,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ),
&handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
*p += ecpoint_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
@ -2156,6 +2265,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int ret;
size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
@ -2181,23 +2291,28 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Now write it out, encrypted
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
@ -2217,6 +2332,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
@ -2292,21 +2411,27 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk );
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
@ -2321,6 +2446,13 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
@ -2463,6 +2595,24 @@ start_processing:
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
@ -2513,6 +2663,8 @@ start_processing:
size_t params_len = p - params;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
@ -2615,18 +2767,22 @@ start_processing:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
@ -2639,8 +2795,7 @@ start_processing:
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
@ -2655,6 +2810,13 @@ start_processing:
#endif
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
@ -2891,7 +3053,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t i, n;
size_t header_len;
size_t content_len;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
@ -2903,16 +3067,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
*/
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( n );
i = 6;
ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( content_len );
header_len = 6;
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
&ssl->out_msg[i], n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
@ -2923,10 +3087,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
return( ret );
@ -2936,6 +3100,119 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_policy_t policy;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
size_t own_pubkey_len;
unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint;
size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len;
psa_crypto_generator_t generator = PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT;
header_len = 4;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
/*
* Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
*/
/* Allocate a new key slot for the private key. */
status = psa_allocate_key( &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
* applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
* the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
* such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
* yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
* For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
* of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
policy = psa_key_policy_init();
psa_key_policy_set_usage( &policy,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE,
PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ) );
status = psa_set_key_policy( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, &policy );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
status = psa_generate_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEYPAIR( handshake->ecdh_psa_curve ),
MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_KEY_BITS_OF_CURVE( handshake->ecdh_psa_curve ),
NULL, 0 );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA
* and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ),
&own_pubkey_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey,
own_pubkey_len,
&own_pubkey_ecpoint,
&own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
/* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */
ssl->out_msg[header_len] = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len;
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1,
own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len );
content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1;
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
status = psa_key_agreement( &generator,
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
PSA_ALG_ECDH( PSA_ALG_SELECT_RAW ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
ssl->handshake->pmslen =
MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_KEY_BYTES_OF_CURVE( handshake->ecdh_psa_curve );
status = psa_generator_read( &generator,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
ssl->handshake->pmslen );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_generator_abort( &generator );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
status = psa_generator_abort( &generator );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = 0;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
@ -2948,7 +3225,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
*/
i = 4;
header_len = 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
@ -2961,8 +3238,8 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], 1000,
&content_len,
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
@ -2980,19 +3257,19 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = n;
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len;
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
}
ecdh_calc_secret:
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
n = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
@ -3016,39 +3293,50 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL )
if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
* and we check that the server's choice is among the
* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
i = 4;
n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
header_len = 4;
content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or "
"SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len );
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, ssl->conf->psk_identity, ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
i += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len,
ssl->conf->psk_identity,
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
n = 0;
content_len = 0;
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 2 ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
&content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
@ -3056,24 +3344,31 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
*/
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
if( header_len + 2 + content_len >
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long"
" or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = (unsigned char)( content_len );
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
&ssl->out_msg[i], n,
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
@ -3086,11 +3381,19 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
*/
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i,
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&content_len,
&ssl->out_msg[header_len],
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
@ -3108,6 +3411,17 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK &&
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -3120,8 +3434,9 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
i = 4;
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 0 ) ) != 0 )
header_len = 4;
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
&content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
@ -3129,10 +3444,12 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
i = 4;
header_len = 4;
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n,
ssl->out_msg + header_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
&content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
@ -3157,7 +3474,7 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->out_msglen = i + n;
ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
@ -3174,12 +3491,7 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
@ -3194,11 +3506,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
@ -3208,7 +3516,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
@ -3237,11 +3545,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
@ -3384,12 +3688,7 @@ sign:
return( ret );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@ -3463,6 +3762,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ticket_len == 0 )
return( 0 );
if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
ssl->session->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );

View file

@ -149,6 +149,48 @@ static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->f_psk != NULL )
return( 1 );
if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL )
return( 0 );
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL )
{
/* If we've used a callback to select the PSK,
* the static configuration is irrelevant. */
if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
@ -867,9 +909,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
/* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
* have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) );
return( 0 );
@ -1449,7 +1489,7 @@ read_record_header:
*/
/*
* Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions ommitted) is
* Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
*/
@ -2640,12 +2680,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
@ -2653,11 +2688,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
@ -2667,7 +2698,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
@ -2691,11 +2722,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#endif
authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ||
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ||
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) );
@ -2834,12 +2861,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
@ -3649,9 +3671,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
int ret = 0;
size_t n;
if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL &&
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) )
if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
@ -3831,6 +3851,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically
* and skip the intermediate PMS. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -3862,6 +3889,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret );
@ -3891,6 +3924,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) );
@ -3922,6 +3961,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */
if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
@ -3985,12 +4030,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
@ -3998,11 +4038,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
@ -4012,7 +4048,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
@ -4026,21 +4062,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ||
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ );
if( 0 != ret )
@ -4061,6 +4109,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* struct {
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
@ -4075,8 +4134,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
hashlen = 36;
/* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
{
hash_start += 16;
hashlen -= 16;
@ -4131,7 +4189,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
@ -4164,7 +4222,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Calculate hash and verify signature */
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk,
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
@ -4178,12 +4236,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )

View file

@ -54,6 +54,19 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */
#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4
#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12
#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2
#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16
#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \
TICKET_IV_BYTES + \
TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \
TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES )
#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \
TICKET_IV_BYTES + \
TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES )
/*
* Generate/update a key
*/
@ -141,11 +154,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx,
cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
return( ret );
/* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA,
* so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx,
cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
return( ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 )
@ -158,9 +187,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
/*
* Serialize a session in the following format:
* 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
* n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate)
* n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1
*
* - If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is enabled:
* 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
* n . n+2 peer_cert length = m (0 if no certificate)
* n+3 . n+2+m peer cert ASN.1
*
* - If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is disabled:
* 0 . n-1 session structure, n = sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)
* n . n length of peer certificate digest = k (0 if no digest)
* n+1 . n+k peer certificate digest (digest type encoded in session)
*/
static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
@ -169,17 +205,25 @@ static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t left = buf_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
size_t cert_len;
#else
size_t cert_digest_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( left < sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
/* This also copies the values of pointer fields in the
* session to be serialized, but they'll be ignored when
* loading the session through ssl_load_session(). */
memcpy( p, session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
left -= sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
if( session->peer_cert == NULL )
cert_len = 0;
else
@ -191,11 +235,31 @@ static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len ) & 0xFF );
left -= 3;
if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len );
p += cert_len;
left -= cert_len;
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
cert_digest_len = 0;
else
cert_digest_len = session->peer_cert_digest_len;
if( left < 1 + cert_digest_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
*p++ = (unsigned char) cert_digest_len;
left--;
if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL )
memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest, cert_digest_len );
p += cert_digest_len;
left -= cert_digest_len;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
*olen = p - buf;
@ -212,7 +276,11 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
const unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char * const end = buf + len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
size_t cert_len;
#else
size_t cert_digest_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > (size_t)( end - p ) )
@ -221,18 +289,29 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
/* Non-NULL pointer fields of `session` are meaningless
* and potentially harmful. Zeroize them for safety. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
session->peer_cert = NULL;
#else
session->peer_cert_digest = NULL;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
session->ticket = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */
if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
p += 3;
if( cert_len == 0 )
{
session->peer_cert = NULL;
}
else
if( cert_len != 0 )
{
int ret;
@ -257,6 +336,30 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
p += cert_len;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */
if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cert_digest_len = (size_t) p[0];
p++;
if( cert_digest_len != 0 )
{
if( cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ||
cert_digest_len != session->peer_cert_digest_len )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
session->peer_cert_digest = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cert_digest_len );
if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p, cert_digest_len );
p += cert_digest_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( p != end )
@ -278,6 +381,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
* The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional
* authenticated data.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *start,
@ -289,9 +393,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = start;
unsigned char *iv = start + 4;
unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + 12;
unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + 2;
unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES;
unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES;
unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES;
unsigned char *tag;
size_t clear_len, ciph_len;
@ -302,7 +406,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
/* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag,
* in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */
if( end - start < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 )
if( end - start < TICKET_MIN_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -317,9 +421,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
*ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime;
memcpy( key_name, key->name, 4 );
memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES );
if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, 12 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
/* Dump session state */
@ -335,8 +439,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
/* Encrypt and authenticate */
tag = state + clear_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( &key->ctx,
iv, 12, key_name, 4 + 12 + 2,
state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 )
iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES,
/* Additional data: key name, IV and length */
key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN,
state, clear_len, state, &ciph_len,
tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
{
goto cleanup;
}
@ -346,7 +453,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket,
goto cleanup;
}
*tlen = 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 + ciph_len;
*tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len;
cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -385,17 +492,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket;
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key;
unsigned char *key_name = buf;
unsigned char *iv = buf + 4;
unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + 12;
unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + 2;
unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES;
unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES;
unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES;
unsigned char *tag;
size_t enc_len, clear_len;
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* See mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write() */
if( len < 4 + 12 + 2 + 16 )
if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -409,7 +515,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1];
tag = ticket + enc_len;
if( len != 4 + 12 + 2 + enc_len + 16 )
if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
@ -425,9 +531,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket,
}
/* Decrypt and authenticate */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx, iv, 12,
key_name, 4 + 12 + 2, ticket, enc_len,
ticket, &clear_len, tag, 16 ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &key->ctx,
iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES,
/* Additional data: key name, IV and length */
key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN,
ticket, enc_len,
ticket, &clear_len,
tag, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT)
"MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT)
"MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT)
"MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */
@ -300,6 +303,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES)
"MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES)
"MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
@ -420,6 +426,12 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
"MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_HAS_ITS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
"MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
@ -447,6 +459,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
"MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
"MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
"MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
@ -516,6 +531,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
"MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
"MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES)
"MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */
@ -684,6 +702,18 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
"MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_FILE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C)
"MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_ITS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
"MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */

View file

@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
}
/*
* Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) paramaters
* Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params )

View file

@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
@ -368,7 +373,7 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ )
{
ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
ver_chain->items[i].flags = -1;
ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1;
}
ver_chain->len = 0;
@ -829,8 +834,10 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p,
/*
* Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
*/
static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen,
int make_copy )
{
int ret;
size_t len;
@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *
if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
// Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length
/* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
p = (unsigned char*) buf;
len = buflen;
end = p + len;
@ -865,25 +872,26 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );
}
if( len > (size_t) ( end - p ) )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );
}
crt_end = p + len;
// Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field
crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
if( p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( p, buf, crt->raw.len );
// Direct pointers to the new buffer
p += crt->raw.len - len;
end = crt_end = p + len;
crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
if( make_copy != 0 )
{
/* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );
if( crt->raw.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len );
crt->own_buffer = 1;
p += crt->raw.len - len;
end = crt_end = p + len;
}
else
{
crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf;
crt->own_buffer = 0;
}
/*
* TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
@ -988,11 +996,13 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *
/*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo
*/
crt->pk_raw.p = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );
return( ret );
}
crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p;
/*
* issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
@ -1086,8 +1096,10 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const unsigned char *
* Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
* chained list
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen,
int make_copy )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
@ -1119,7 +1131,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *bu
crt = crt->next;
}
if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy ) ) != 0 )
{
if( prev )
prev->next = NULL;
@ -1133,11 +1145,27 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *bu
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0 ) );
}
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1 ) );
}
/*
* Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
* list
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
@ -1892,16 +1920,35 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t hash_len;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#else
psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md );
if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( -1 );
if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
/* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
return( -1 );
}
if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
return( -1 );
@ -1910,7 +1957,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
{
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
}
#else
@ -1918,7 +1965,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
#endif
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
}
@ -2237,7 +2284,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
* Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
* - trusted EE
* - EE -> trusted root
* - EE -> intermedate CA -> trusted root
* - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root
* - if relevant: EE untrusted
* - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
* with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
@ -2675,7 +2722,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
mbedtls_free( seq_prv );
}
if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL )
if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len );
mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p );

View file

@ -279,15 +279,24 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, siz
{
mbedtls_pem_init( &pem );
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
"-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
"-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )
{
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,
"-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
"-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----",
buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );
}
if( ret == 0 )
{
/*
* Was PEM encoded, parse the result
*/
ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, pem.buf, pem.buflen );
}
mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )

View file

@ -221,23 +221,36 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *
int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
unsigned int key_usage )
{
unsigned char buf[4], ku;
unsigned char buf[5], ku[2];
unsigned char *c;
int ret;
const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY |
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY;
/* We currently only support 7 bits, from 0x80 to 0x02 */
if( ( key_usage & ~0xfe ) != 0 )
/* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */
if( ( key_usage & ~allowed_bits ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
c = buf + 4;
ku = (unsigned char) key_usage;
c = buf + 5;
ku[0] = (unsigned char)( key_usage );
ku[1] = (unsigned char)( key_usage >> 8 );
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, ku, 9 );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ku, 7 ) ) != 4 )
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
else if( ret < 3 || ret > 5 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );
ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE,
MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ),
1, buf, 4 );
1, c, (size_t)ret );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -253,12 +266,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
c = buf + 4;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ) ) != 4 )
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 );
if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE,
MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ),
0, buf, 4 );
0, c, (size_t)ret );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );

View file

@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@ -89,12 +94,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned ch
c = buf + 4;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 7 ) ) != 4 )
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 );
if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE,
MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ),
buf, 4 );
c, (size_t)ret );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -110,12 +116,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
c = buf + 4;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ) ) != 4 )
ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 );
if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE,
MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ),
buf, 4 );
c, (size_t)ret );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -136,7 +143,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
size_t hash_len;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/*
* Prepare data to be signed in tmp_buf
*/
@ -187,9 +198,23 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s
/*
* Prepare signature
* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error
*/
mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )
!= PSA_SUCCESS )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{

1
programs/.gitignore vendored
View file

@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ test/cpp_dummy_build
test/ssl_cert_test
test/udp_proxy
test/zeroize
test/query_compile_time_config
util/pem2der
util/strerror
x509/cert_app

View file

@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ LOCAL_LDFLAGS = -L../library \
-lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \
-lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX)
ifdef USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE
LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -L../crypto/library
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -I../crypto/include
LOCAL_CXXFLAGS += -I../crypto/include
endif
ifndef SHARED
DEP=../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../library/libmbedx509.a ../library/libmbedtls.a
else
@ -70,6 +76,7 @@ APPS = aes/aescrypt2$(EXEXT) aes/crypt_and_hash$(EXEXT) \
test/ssl_cert_test$(EXEXT) test/benchmark$(EXEXT) \
test/selftest$(EXEXT) test/udp_proxy$(EXEXT) \
test/zeroize$(EXEXT) \
test/query_compile_time_config$(EXEXT) \
util/pem2der$(EXEXT) util/strerror$(EXEXT) \
x509/cert_app$(EXEXT) x509/crl_app$(EXEXT) \
x509/cert_req$(EXEXT) x509/cert_write$(EXEXT) \
@ -212,17 +219,17 @@ ssl/ssl_client1$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_client1.c $(DEP)
echo " CC ssl/ssl_client1.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_client1.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
ssl/ssl_client2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_client2.c $(DEP)
ssl/ssl_client2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_client2.c ssl/query_config.c $(DEP)
echo " CC ssl/ssl_client2.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_client2.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_client2.c ssl/query_config.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
ssl/ssl_server$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_server.c $(DEP)
echo " CC ssl/ssl_server.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_server.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
ssl/ssl_server2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_server2.c $(DEP)
ssl/ssl_server2$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_server2.c ssl/query_config.c $(DEP)
echo " CC ssl/ssl_server2.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_server2.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) ssl/ssl_server2.c ssl/query_config.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
ssl/ssl_fork_server$(EXEXT): ssl/ssl_fork_server.c $(DEP)
echo " CC ssl/ssl_fork_server.c"
@ -264,6 +271,10 @@ test/zeroize$(EXEXT): test/zeroize.c $(DEP)
echo " CC test/zeroize.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/zeroize.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
test/query_compile_time_config$(EXEXT): test/query_compile_time_config.c ssl/query_config.c $(DEP)
echo " CC test/query_compile_time_config.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) test/query_compile_time_config.c ssl/query_config.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
util/pem2der$(EXEXT): util/pem2der.c $(DEP)
echo " CC util/pem2der.c"
$(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) util/pem2der.c $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@

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